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SAVING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY 
Daryl Lim* 
Abstract 
Substantial similarity, an analysis of the similarity between two 
works, is the fulcrum of copyright infringement. Recent cases involving 
Led Zeppelin’s signature song “Stairway to Heaven,” the award-winning 
movie “The Shape of Water,” and Google and Oracle’s dispute over 
computer code all required courts to grapple with this fundamental 
analysis. This Article reveals that today’s copyright plaintiffs have only 
a one-in-ten chance of winning—the worst in a century—and also 
discusses the cause of this trend—defendants’ devastatingly effective 
use of pretrial motions and the rise of lawsuits against nonrival 
defendants. Scholarly debates on substantial similarity typically revolve 
around the works of authorship at issue, circuit splits, and leading cases. 
These discussions entirely miss the unprecedented and unreported 
demise of substantial similarity.  
Rehabilitating the doctrine will require a fresh look at how to judge 
substantial similarity. Judging when defendants appropriated too much 
can be an inherently opaque and subjective enterprise. To many courts 
and scholars, substantial similarity is “bizarre,” “ad hoc,” and “a virtual 
black hole in copyright jurisprudence.” Every creative work borrows 
some inspiration from other works, whether copyrighted or not. If left 
theoretically unaddressed, the law will continue adrift without compass 
or rudder, inhibiting the growth of creative industries. Helping plaintiffs 
win fairly and viably will be critical in fostering diverse, innovative 
ecosystems like architecture, literature, movies, and software flourish. 
For this to happen, three things must change. 
First, courts must judge works holistically from the vantage of an 
ordinary observer and, once plaintiffs prove facial similarity, defendants 
should then explain why they are not infringing. Avoiding elemental 
dissections of the copyrighted work makes substantial similarity easier 
for fact finders to administer, which makes them less likely to penalize 
plaintiffs whose works invariably incorporate some unprotectable 
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elements. Second, jurors must be the default arbiters of substantial 
similarity. Laypeople, and not experts, are copyright’s principal 
audience. Third, courts must require copyright registrants to identify the 
expressive elements of the works in their registrations, which will help 
clarify what they seek to protect and provide better notice to defendants. 
Beyond copyright, the observations and insights in this Article map to 
broader scholarly debates on rules versus standards, the centrality of jury 
trials, and structural biases within the American justice system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Substantial similarity, an analysis of the similarity between two 
works, is the fulcrum of copyright law.1 Recent cases involving Led 
Zeppelin’s signature song “Stairway to Heaven,” the award-winning 
movie “The Shape of Water,” and Google and Oracle’s dispute over their 
computer code all required courts to grapple with this fundamental 
analysis.2 After establishing that defendants copied plaintiffs’ works, the 
substantial similarity doctrine requires courts to determine whether 
defendants took “enough” from plaintiffs by seeing if the copy was a 
misappropriated, colorable variation of the original.3 Its complexity rivals 
copyright law’s fair-use defense.4 Judges and scholars have called the 
court-developed tests to assess substantial similarity “ad hoc,”5 
“bizarre,”6 and “a virtual black hole in copyright jurisprudence.”7 The 
 
 1. See Lydia Pallas Loren & R. Anthony Reese, Proving Infringement: Burdens of Proof 
in Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 621, 646 (2019) (“The inquiry 
into substantial similarity is, in some ways, the heart of many infringement cases.”).   
 2. See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1056, 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2020) (en 
banc), cert. denied sub nom. Skidmore v. Zeppelin, No. 20-142, 2020 WL 5883816 (U.S. Oct. 5, 
2020); Zindel v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 815 F. App’x 158, 159–60 (9th Cir. 2020); Oracle 
Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1185, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 
520 (2019). 
 3. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Essay, Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 
268, 288–89 (2014) (describing substantial similarity as “an essential component of almost all 
copyright infringement actions that do not involve outright copying by a defendant”). 
 4. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement 
Analysis, 68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2016) (“The complexity of the modern copyright 
infringement analysis cannot be overstated. Often referred to as the ‘substantial similarity’ 
requirement, its structure, scope, and purpose continue to confound courts and scholars—perhaps 
even more so (and more routinely) than the infamous fair use doctrine.”); see also 4 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A], Lexis+ (database updated Aug. 
2020) (recognizing the substantial similarity doctrine as “one of the most difficult questions in 
copyright law”); Pamela Samuelson, Essay, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright 
Infringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1822 (2013) (describing substantial similarity as “[a] 
central puzzle for U.S. copyright law in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries”).  
 5. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) 
(opinion of Judge Learned Hand). 
 6. Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010) (referring to the substantial similarity doctrine in the 
title). 
 7. Balganesh, supra note 4, at 794; see also Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1823 (arguing 
each of these tests is flawed and that courts have generally failed to provide clear guidance about 
which test to apply in which kinds of cases); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The 
Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 716–38 (2012) (critiquing the tests).  
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debate has gone on for decades, with no end in sight.8 To make matters 
worse, courts must apply these tests across a diverse set of industries and 
creative products.9  
As a result, lawyers cannot adequately evaluate claims of copyright 
infringement that they receive.10 Unlike patent law, where courts can rely 
on claims to delineate the boundaries of their plaintiff’s property rights 
(even if claim construction methodologies are underdetermined and the 
results of applying them may vary), substantial similarity’s indefiniteness 
gives rise to no more than “the right to hire a lawyer.”11 Despite circuit 
court divisions over tests for substantial similarity, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has remained silent.12  
The problem is that judging substantial similarity demands courts to 
apply subjective, value-based judgments to the facts without clear 
guidance on how to do so. The result is a patchwork of rhetoric resting 
on confusing generalizations that ultimately translate into “I’ll know it 
 
 8. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 
DUKE L.J. 203, 214 (2012) (viewing substantial similarity as a mechanism of conceptually 
sequencing values in copyright law and informing a more coherent framework for the fair-use 
doctrine); Kevin J. Hickey, Reframing Similarity Analysis in Copyright, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 
718–19 (2016) (arguing courts should adopt a flexible, contextual approach to framing); Daniel 
Gervais, Improper Appropriation, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 599, 600 (2019) (suggesting that 
propriety should play an enhanced role in cases of reuse of preexisting copyrighted works); Jessica 
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1005 (1990) (“The determination of substantial 
similarity is largely subjective, thus permitting the finder of fact to give effect to its intuitive 
judgment of the perceived equities in a case.”); Katherine Lippman, Comment, The Beginning of 
the End: Preliminary Results of an Empirical Study of Copyright Substantial Similarity Opinions 
in the U.S. Circuit Courts, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 513, 541 (“[T]here can be no doubt that the 
substantial similarity doctrine has perplexed students, scholars, and courts for decades.”). 
 9. See Michael L. Sharb, Getting A “Total Concept and Feel” of Copyright Infringement, 
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 903, 904 (1993) (arguing that “the ad hoc nature of copyright infringement” 
requires a flexible test, and “[y]et, there must be a common structure in order for the courts, as in 
other areas of the law, to build an underlying body of substantive common law”); see also 
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1821 (arguing for courts “to tailor infringement analysis based on the 
nature of the works at issue”); Nicole Lieberman, Note, Un-Blurring Substantial Similarity: 
Aesthetic Judgments and Romantic Authorship in Music Copyright Law, 6 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. 
& ENT. L. 91, 93 (2016) (“[C]ourts have crafted an impressionistic doctrine that has drifted far 
from copyright’s original economic purpose of incentivizing creation.”). 
 10. Robert F. Helfing, Substantial Similarity and Junk Science: Reconstructing the Test of 
Copyright Infringement, 30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 735, 737 (2020) (“The 
elusive standard frustrates the effective evaluation of claims by lawyers, generating unnecessary 
litigation.”); see also Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Note, Do We Even Need A Test? A Reevaluation of 
Assessing Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1375, 1375 
(2007) (“The improper appropriation analysis, for both courts and litigants, is one of the most 
contentious and least precisely defined inquires in copyright law.” (footnote omitted)). 
 11. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) (referring to fair use). 
 12. See infra notes 165–166 and accompanying text. 
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when I see it” determinations.13 This indeterminacy is troubling. Blindly 
navigating the morass of caselaw on substantial similarity without 
understanding its contours risks defeating the purpose of copyright law 
itself.14  
It is worth noting at this early stage that there are two problems: 
variability (because of the different tests applied in different circuits) and 
uncertainty (given that none of the tests have determinate content). The 
variability leads to different results concerning the uncertainty of when 
courts apply a given test to a large sample of cases. Failing to understand 
how substantial similarity works prevents courts and scholars from 
clearly outlining the necessary components of plaintiffs’ evidence in 
infringement cases and obscures the standards courts should identify in 
the cases before them.15 This state of affairs may result in false positives 
and chill efforts by rivals, as well as those in ancillary markets, from 
developing noninfringing works, and it may even cause them to abandon 
their efforts if they cannot afford to face those unnecessarily heightened 
risks.16 Unaddressed, copyright law will continue adrift without compass 
or rudder, inhibiting the growth of creative industries.  
The American economy rests at a transcendent and transformative 
inflection point in its history, and the vitality of the substantial similarity 
doctrine forms an essential part of it. The stakes for getting the law on 
substantial similarity right are high. In 2017, copyright industries in the 
United States contributed over $1 trillion to the gross domestic product, 
accounted for almost 7% of the U.S. economy, and employed about 6 
million workers, comprising close to 4% of the entire workforce in the 
 
 13. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.03[A] (“The determination of the extent of 
similarity [which] will constitute a substantial, and hence infringing, similarity presents one of 
the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one which is the least susceptible of helpful 
generalizations.” (footnote omitted)); Hickey, supra note 8, at 682 (“[S]ubstantial similarity, 
copyright law’s core infringement inquiry, is a mess. Once the law allows that non-exact copies 
are actionable, courts need some method to determine when two works are so alike that one should 
be deemed an actionable infringement of the other.”); Jarrod M. Mohler, Comment, Toward a 
Better Understanding of Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 971, 972 (2000) (describing the “indeterminacy and misapplication of tests for copyright 
infringement”). 
 14. See Helfing, supra note 10, at 737 (“It also produces legal decisions that defeat the 
purposes of copyright law more often than should be tolerated.”). 
 15. See Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling 
Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1990) (arguing that a 
correct perception of the nature of similarity is necessary to “clarify the elements of proof required 
in copyright infringement cases, the variety of methods available to establish those elements and 
the proper standards for appellate review of infringement issues”). 
 16. See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1387 
(2015) (describing the “added layer of perniciousness” of overclaiming stemming from uncertain 
copyright scope for downstream creators and concluding that clarity “may not only decrease 
constraint’s costs but also increase its benefits”).  
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United States.17 In 2018, litigants filed nearly 6,000 copyright 
infringement cases, a threefold increase from the number of cases filed a 
decade ago.18 On average, copyright cases cost between  $200,000 and 
$1 million to litigate.19  
The most important and immediate benefit of reforming substantial 
similarity is that plaintiffs will once again have a viable means of 
enforcing their copyrights when they should be able to prove improper, 
actionable infringement. Today, copyright plaintiffs have only a one-in-
ten chance of winning—the worst in a century.20 Giving copyright 
plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to win meritorious lawsuits benefits 
the flourishing of diverse, creative ecosystems like architecture, 
literature, movies, and software.21 
Scholarly debates on substantial similarity typically revolve around 
the works of authorship at issue, circuit splits, and leading cases; they 
have entirely missed the unprecedented and unreported demise in 
copyright plaintiffs’ ability to prove substantial similarity.22 This Article 
reveals that defendants’ devastatingly effective use of pretrial motions 
and the courts’ focus on market effect as a heuristic are the two key 
culprits to substantial similarity’s demise, and it argues that rehabilitating 
the doctrine to permit plaintiffs to win when they should do so will 
require a fresh look at how to judge substantial similarity.23 For this to 
happen, three things must change.  
First, courts must judge works holistically from the vantage of an 
ordinary observer and, once plaintiffs prove facial similarity, defendants 
should then explain why their works are not infringing.24 Nevertheless, 
courts must still determine what the protected expressive elements of the 
allegedly infringed works are and how those compare as a whole to the 
allegedly infringing works.25 Avoiding elemental dissection of the 
copyrighted work initially will make substantial similarity easier for fact 
finders to administer, which makes them less likely to penalize plaintiffs 
 
 17. See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 3 (2018), 
https://iipa.org/files/uploads/2018/12/2018CpyrtRptFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVR3-ZDCT]. 
 18. See Just the Facts: Intellectual Property Cases—Patent, Copyright, and Trademark, 
U.S. COURTS (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/02/13/just-facts-intellectual-
property-cases-patent-copyright-and-trademark#figures_map [https://perma.cc/X9YU-L28V] 
(condensing relevant statistics to a line graph in Figure 1). 
 19. See ASS’N RSCH., INC., AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 
2017, at 41, 44 (2017); TOD I. ZUCKERMAN ET AL., ASSETS & FINANCE: INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CYBER CLAIMS § 1:6 (2011) (noting that the average cost of 
litigating a copyright case was $440,000, according to a 2005 report). 
 20. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 21. See infra Section II.A.3. 
 22. See infra Section II.A. 
 23. See infra Sections II.B–C. 
 24. See infra Section III.B. 
 25. See infra Section III.B.1. 
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whose works invariably incorporate some unprotectable elements. Of 
course, one still needs to assess unprotectable elements and determine, 
“as a whole,” what the creative advance is that defines the “creative 
work” that is then compared to the allegedly infringing work for 
substantial similarity. However, that task should fall on defendants, who, 
as courts have noted, are the parties best positioned to do so.26 
Second, jurors should be restored as the default arbiters of substantial 
similarity.27 Laypeople, and not experts, are copyright’s principal 
audience.28 The need to clarify the jury’s role in copyright litigation has 
become more relevant than ever due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ordering of Google and Oracle to file supplemental briefs concerning the 
appropriate standard of review for the jury’s fair use verdict in favor of 
Google in their copyright litigation.29  
Design law successfully undertook similar corrective measures over 
a decade ago.30 Those corrective measures hold valuable lessons to 
reforming substantial similarity and improving both its administrability 
and predictability.31 
Third, courts must require copyright registrants to identify the 
expressive elements of the works in their registrations, which will help 
clarify what they seek to protect and provide notice to defendants. Unlike 
with patents, copyright registrants need not know the prior art to state 
that they think something is copyrightable expression. Nor does the fact 
that copyrights are registered but not examined matter since courts expert 
judgments about whether the claimed expressive elements (by 
themselves or in combination) or protectable expression are either 
copyrightable are not always needed. 
Courts can then properly focus on both technical and economic 
aspects of substantial similarity. Currently, it appears courts use rivalry 
as a heuristic for operationalizing substantial similarity because technical 
analysis is too complicated.32 What is substantially similar needs a 
greater definition of how much time, money, and effort is needed for 
protection and avoidance, mainly where the alleged infringer builds off 
of or partially incorporates the idea, as in the case of satires and parodies. 
Simplifying substantial similarity will help courts properly consider both 
technical and economic aspects of the inquiry.  
 
 26. See infra notes 350–51, 371–74 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 28. See infra Section III.C.2. 
 29. Jan Wolfe, SCOTUS Asks for More Briefing in Oracle v. Google Copyright Case, 
REUTERS (May 4, 2020, 9:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ip-copyright-oracle/scotus-
asks-for-more-briefing-in-oracle-v-google-copyright-case-idUSL1N2CN01G [https://perma.cc/ 
58SJ-JWGS]. 
 30. See infra Section III.B.1–2.  
 31. See infra Section III.B. 
 32. See infra Section II.C. 
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Part I describes the confusing patchwork of substantial similarity law, 
as well as the challenging task fact finders undertake in every case. It also 
sketches the empirical aspects of this Article and their limits.33 Part II 
then reports on substantial similarity’s silent death.34 It looks beyond the 
clamor of scholarly debate over the confusing tests and circuit variations 
to reveal a surprising partnership between judges and defendants. Part II 
also highlights the impact suing nonrivals has on case outcomes. Finally, 
Part III presents the playbook for revitalizing substantial similarity. 
Beyond copyright, the discussion here contributes directly to broader 
scholarly debates on rules versus standards, the centrality of jury trials, 
and structural biases within the American justice system.35 
I.  COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT’S BLACK BOX 
Congress has the constitutional mandate to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries” to benefit the public.36 Through the Copyright Act of 
1976,37 authors of “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression” may obtain protection for a limited duration.38  
These “works of authorship” encompass literary, architectural, 
pictorial, sculptural, and graphic works.39 They must contain “at least 
some minimal degree of creativity,” but “even a slight amount will 
suffice.”40 Most make the grade “as they possess some creative spark, ‘no 
matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”41 In doing so, 
copyright protects works that might be similar to those in the public 
domain or to other copyrightable works.42 Moreover, this makes 
infringement rather than validity the principal means of regulating the 
scope of those rights.43  
 
 33. Adapted from findings in an extensive empirical study on substantial similarity in Daryl 
Lim, Substantial Similarity’s Silent Death, PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
 34. Id.  
 35. See infra Section III.C. 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 37. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.). 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see also Roodhuyzen, supra note 10, at 1379 (“[T]he Act specifies 
in detail the kinds of works that are protected and for how long; creates protection even without 
registration or notice; assigns exclusive rights and allows for transfer and division of ownership 
and rights; and creates various remedies including damages and fines.” (quoting Jason Mazzone, 
Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1037–38 (2006))).  
 39. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 40. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 41. Id. (quoting 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][1] (1990)). 
 42. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2226 
(2016). 
 43. See id. 
8
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Authors enjoy a bundle of rights to reproduce, distribute, and display 
their works, prepare derivative works, and publicly perform.44 To enforce 
these rights, the Copyright Act empowers copyright owners to sue for 
infringement.45 Unfortunately, neither the Act nor its legislative history 
explains what plaintiffs must show to claim infringement. Courts, 
therefore, devised the rule that plaintiffs must prove both that they have 
a valid copyright in the work and that the defendant wrongfully copied 
from the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.46 Substantial similarity’s 
foundation as an ad hoc doctrine originates here.47 Judging substantial 
similarity can be daunting because the fact finder must distinguish 
copyrightable expression from unprotected factual descriptions without 
linguistic aids like those found in patent claims.48 The doctrinal 
patchwork of rules juxtaposed on a factually intensive inquiry produces 
a morass of unclear precedent almost by default.  
This Part establishes the substantial similarity doctrine’s place within 
an otherwise intricately crafted statutory framework that is the Copyright 
Act.49 After Section I.A lays out the elements of infringement, Section 
I.B reviews the various tests circuit courts have devised to answer the 
substantial similarity inquiry. It concludes with the limit courts placed on 
substantial similarity to protect defendants and the public’s right to enjoy 
uncopyrightable material.50 
A.  Actual Copying 
In copyright infringement cases, the plaintiff must show the defendant 
copied material from the plaintiff’s copyrighted work rather than creating 
it or copying it from another source, and that the defendant copied enough 
copyrighted material from the plaintiff’s work.51 The plaintiff’s first task 
is to prove actual copying and to do so using either direct or indirect 
evidence.52 While showing that the defendant directly copied the work 
verbatim seems like the most obvious method of doing this, direct proof 
 
 44. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 45. See id. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 . . . is an infringer of the copyright . . . .”); id. 
§ 501(b) (“The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to 
institute an action for any infringement . . . .”). 
 46. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.  
 47. See id. at 345, 361.  
 48. See infra Section III.B.3. 
 49. See infra Section I.A.  
 50. See infra Section I.B. 
 51. Eric Osterberg, Copyright Litigation: Analyzing Substantial Similarity, PRACTICAL 
LAW, https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-524-1501.  
 52. See id. (noting that direct proof of actual copying includes admissions, eyewitness 
testimony, and “[t]he presence of watermarks or other features in the defendant’s work 
conclusively identifying the plaintiff’s work as the source”).  
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of actual copying is scarce.53 Eyewitnesses are hard to come by, and it is 
even harder to find infringers who voluntarily confess.54 Most allegedly 
infringing works are not identical, which explains why substantial 
similarity plays such an outsized role in copyright infringement.55  
Without evidence of direct copying, “striking similarity” is the first 
way for owners to show actual copying through indirect evidence.56 
Striking similarity is a likeness between works so exact it cannot be 
explained other than by copying, thereby creating an inference of actual 
copying or access to the plaintiff’s work.57 The second way plaintiffs can 
prove actual copying by indirect evidence is through circumstantial 
evidence of access paired with “probative similarity.”58 This requires 
plaintiffs to show the defendant had a reasonable possibility of accessing 
their work and that similarities between the works are probative of actual 
copying.59 Courts sometimes confuse probative similarity (which looks 
to the defendant’s actions for evidence of copying) with substantial 
similarity (which looks to the works themselves to see if the amount 
copied was permissible).60  
A plaintiff might also prove the defendant had access through 
widespread dissemination of the plaintiff’s work,61 or that the plaintiff 
 
 53. See Howard Root, Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A 
Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1275–76 (1984) 
(“Because pirates are unlikely to be obvious about their copying, proof of the direct use of the 
copyrighted work in preparing a copy is virtually impossible.” (footnote omitted)). 
 54. See ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 161 (5th ed. 1979) (discussing the importance 
of circumstantial evidence in copyright litigation). 
 55. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.01[B] (“It is generally not possible to 
establish copying as a factual matter by direct evidence, as it is rare that the plaintiff has available 
a witness to the physical act of copying. . . . Therefore, copying is ordinarily established indirectly 
by the plaintiff's proof of access and ‘substantial’ similarity.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 56. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (introducing the idea of “striking 
similarity” by holding that “the similarities [between the two works] must be so striking as to 
preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant” created the work independently), abrogated 
on other grounds by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975). Courts 
consider the similarities’ quirks, including mistakes or idiosyncrasies attributed to copying. See, 
e.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170–71 (7th Cir. 1997); Lipton v. Nature 
Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471–72 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 57. See Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Arnstein, 154 F.2d 
at 468); Malibu Textiles, Inc. v. Label Lane Int’l, Inc., 922 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir.), cert denied 
sub nom. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, LP v. Malibu Textiles, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 456 (2019).  
 58. Tanksley v. Daniels, 902 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1175 
(2019), reh’g denied, 139 S. Ct. 1596 (2019).  
 59. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
speculative possibility of access was insufficient to establish probative similarity), overruled in 
part by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). 
 60. See Tanksley, 902 F.3d at 173. 
 61. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d. Cir. 1983) 
(finding that the defendant may have had access to a song because of its widespread popularity 
on music charts).  
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sent the work to the defendant to review.62 As with striking similarity, the 
plaintiff can show similar uses of public domain material, similar details, 
or errors in the plaintiff’s work that would be unexpected without 
copying.63 Some courts endorse a sliding scale approach, called the 
“inverse ratio rule,” where more substantial evidence of access requires 
less evidence of probative similarity. In Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin,64 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court recently joined other 
circuits in clarifying the inverse ratio rule did not apply to substantial 
similarity.65 Specifically, the court noted that the majority of other 
circuits that considered the rule (the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits) declined to adopt it.66 Skidmore criticized the law as illogical 
because complete access should not preclude the need for plaintiffs to 
show similarity as it provides an unfair advantage to those with more 
accessible works.67  
Post-Skidmore, however, it remains uncertain whether and to what 
extent the inverse ratio rule lives on in the actual copying limb of the 
copyright infringement inquiry. The Ninth Circuit noted that “[b]y 
rejecting the inverse ratio rule, we are not suggesting that access cannot 
serve as circumstantial evidence of actual copying in all cases.”68 Thus, 
access and probative similarity can still prove that actual copying 
occurred. Skidmore appears to leave intact the line of cases holding that 
striking similarity can constitute actual copying even with limited 
evidence of access.  
In any case, not all copying amounts to infringement. The accused 
work and copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s work must also be 
sufficiently substantial to amount to an unlawful appropriation. Plaintiffs 
must prove substantial similarity—a challenge courts have described as 
“vague” and “arbitrary.”69  
 
 62. See Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 354 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 63. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); L.A. 
Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir. 2012), abrogated in part by 
Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., 959 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 64. 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Skidmore v. Zeppelin, 
No. 20-142, 2020 WL 5883816 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020). 
 65. See id. at 1069; see also Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2012) (criticizing 
and declining to apply the inverse ratio rule). 
 66. Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1066. 
 67. Id. at 1068 (“[T]he inverse ratio rule unfairly advantages those whose work is most 
accessible by lowering the standard of proof for [probative] similarity.”); see also id. (noting that 
access can be established readily in cases when the plaintiff’s work is available on YouTube, 
Netflix, Spotify, and other platforms). 
 68. Id. at 1069. 
 69. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (“The 
test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague.”); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 
45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (explaining that drawing the line between what is protected and 
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B.  Substantial Similarity 
The substantial similarity inquiry seeks to determine whether two 
works share such a similar copyrightable expression that one infringes 
upon the other, making the copying wrongful.70 The inquiry rests on the 
nature of the alleged infringement, the court’s substantial similarity test, 
and the limits to substantial similarity—whether the defendant copied 
unprotectable content, as well as the amount and importance of the 
material that the defendant copied from the plaintiff’s work.71 The 
problem, however, is that the protectable elements of any work can be 
dissected to a point where almost nothing remains but its unprotectable 
parts, and caselaw provides little indication of where to stop in the 
reductionist analysis.72 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
once noted that, if dissection is taken too far, “there can be no originality 
in a painting because all colors of paint have been used somewhere in the 
past.”73 It follows that just as originality can be found in every allegedly 
unoriginal work, unoriginality can be found in almost every unoriginal 
work. How much originality will convince a court is inherently uncertain, 
so what constitutes infringement becomes a crapshoot as well.74 The 
difficulty of this task may help explain why judges, believing in their 
expertise and efficiency, ultimately decided to wrest the substantial 
similarity inquiry from jurors, as Section II.B discusses.  
Courts employ three main tests or some combination thereof: the 
ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/intrinsic test, and the 
 
what is not “will seem arbitrary, [but] that is no excuse for not drawing it”); see also Murray Hill 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing 
part of the substantial similarity inquiry as “complex”).  
 70. See Gervais, supra note 8, at 600 (“The second prong is satisfied when (i) protected 
expression in the earlier work was copied and (ii) the ‘amount of the copyrighted work that is 
copied . . . must be more than “de minimis.”’” (alteration in original) (quoting Castle Rock Ent., 
Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp. Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998))).  
 71. See, e.g., Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120–21 (discussing allegations of copying plot elements 
and characters from a play into a motion picture). This could also include copying computer code 
from the plaintiff's copyrighted software or a sample of musical recording. 
 72. See Helfing, supra note 10, at 740 (“By considering only elements deemed protectable 
at an arbitrary level of dissection, courts fail to reliably identify the similar content that they 
evaluate for protectability.”). It should be noted that it is the combination (or particular 
organization of expressive elements) that may be original and novel, so dissection does not 
actually reduce to nothing. See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th 
Cir. 1994). 
 73. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 74. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.03[A] (“[T]he test for infringement of a 
copyright is of necessity vague.” (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489)); see also Gates 
Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 839 (10th Cir. 1993) (“This is primarily a 
qualitative rather than a purely quantitative analysis and must be performed on a case-by-case 
basis.” (citation omitted)). 
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abstraction/filtration/comparison test.75 Most either adopt the Second 
Circuit’s ordinary observer test or the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic/intrinsic 
test.76 A few adopt the “abstraction/filtration/comparison” test or 
variations of these tests.77 All three tests attempt to compare protectable 
elements in the copyrighted work.78  
1.  The Ordinary Observer Test 
The Second Circuit’s ordinary observer test has the longest vintage of 
the three tests and finds its roots in Arnstein v. Porter.79 In his seminal 
article, Professor Alan Latman observed that the ordinary observer test, 
“when properly understood, remains the most instructive guide to 
proving infringement.”80 Sadly, modern courts would depart from 
Arnstein with devastating consequences for plaintiffs and the vitality of 
the substantial similarity doctrine.  
In Arnstein, composer Ira Arnstein sued Cole Porter for infringing 
copies of his songs, including unpublished ones.81 These songs ranged 
from a million copies sold to a copy kept in Arnstein’s room that had been 
ransacked on several occasions in “burglaries” that the defendant “could 
have” had something to do with.82 There was no direct evidence Porter 
had ever seen or heard Arnstein’s compositions.83 Porter moved for 
summary judgment, claiming to have never heard Arnstein’s songs.84  
a.  How to Judge Substantial Similarity? 
Arnstein made three key contributions. Its initial and most important 
contribution was how the standard for “improper appropriation,” which 
courts eventually renamed “substantial similarity,” should be judged.85 In 
this regard, the court held:  
Assuming that adequate proof is made of copying, that is not 
enough; for there can be “permissible copying,” copying 
which is not illicit. Whether (if he copied) defendant 
 
 75. Hickey, supra note 8, at 690, 692, 694, 699 (“A better (though still imperfect) 
comparison looks to the results under the three main tests: the observer, extrinsic/intrinsic, and 
A/F/C tests.”). 
 76. See infra Section II.A.1 and Figure 1.  
 77. See infra Section II.A.1 and Figure 1.  
 78. See Helfing, supra note 10, at 739. 
 79. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other grounds by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. 
Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975); see Latman, supra note 15, at 1191 (“One may, in tracing 
the history of the proof of infringement, justifiably start with the legendary Arnstein v. Porter.”). 
 80. Latman, supra note 15, at 1191. 
 81. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. See Latman, supra note 15, at 1192 (quoting Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468). 
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unlawfully appropriated presents, too, an issue of fact. The 
proper criterion on that issue is not an analytic or other 
comparison of the respective musical compositions as they 
appear on paper or in the judgment of trained musicians. 
The plaintiff’s legally protected interest is not, as such, his 
reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential 
financial returns from his compositions which derive from 
the lay public’s approbation of his efforts. The question, 
therefore, is whether [the] defendant took from plaintiff’s 
works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, 
who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is 
composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated 
something which belongs to the plaintiff.86 
There are several important takeaways here. First, when a court looks 
at substantial similarity, it is already satisfied that the defendant copied 
the plaintiff’s work. Second, the plaintiff must nonetheless convince the 
adjudicator that the defendant misappropriated the plaintiff’s work by 
showing it took “so much of what is pleasing to” the audience of the 
plaintiff’s work. The ordinary observer test attempts to compare the two 
works from the perspective of a hypothetical lay observer and focuses on 
similarities between the works rather than their differences. Similarities 
suggest defendants saw and copied the works instead of independently 
creating them.87 
The author’s original contribution informs the qualitative and 
quantitative taking needed. Some copyrighted work represents significant 
creative effort and enjoys robust protection, whereas others reflect only 
scant creativity.88 Dissimilarities may be substantial if a defendant’s work 
takes on a different overall concept and feel than the plaintiff’s work or 
has unprotectable elements allegedly taken from the plaintiff.89 The more 
differences that exist between the two works, the less likely that the 
defendant misappropriated the plaintiff’s work.90 However, trivial 
dissimilarities may be insignificant, due to elements similar to those in 
 
 86. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 472–73 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Dymow v. 
Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926)). 
 87. See Latman, supra note 15, at 1189. 
 88. See Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1348 (5th Cir. 
1994) (“[T]he scope of copyright protection [is] a sliding scale that changes with the availability 
of expressions for a given idea . . . .”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.03[A][4] (“More 
similarity is required when less protectible matter is at issue.”). 
 89. See Attia v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d 50, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 90. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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the plaintiff’s work that the defendant did not copy from the plaintiff or 
merely added to the material copied from the plaintiff.91 
Third, substantial similarity is a standard, not a structured rule that 
requires dissection of copyrightable and uncopyrightable elements 
subject to expert evidence. As one treatise observed, “The ordinary 
observer test is no more than an attempt to gauge the reaction of the 
ordinary ‘man on the street’ to the two works . . . . The fact finder decides 
whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as 
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”92  
Arnstein made clear that expert testimony and dissections of the works 
are “irrelevant” to this determination and that the final judgment should 
be made based on a lay listener’s impression about the impropriety of the 
appropriation.93 The court saw the jury as being more representative of 
the audience for the copyrighted work, indicating that it would “be proper 
to exclude tone-deaf persons from the jury,” as they would no longer be 
typical consumers.94 A judge would not likely consume popular music 
and, therefore, ought to employ an advisory jury.95  
The ordinary observer does not need to decompose the works into 
their constituent elements or filter out unprotectable parts, and for a good 
reason. Real-world audiences of copyrighted works consume them based 
on a holistic reception of the work, and they do not conduct an element-
by-element analysis of their copyrightable features. Courts could allow 
expert testimony to help the jury determine the reaction of lay listeners.96 
Arnstein gave courts a malleable and yet predictable standard for 
assessing substantial similarity.  
Courts in other circuits regarded Arnstein as defective. The First, 
Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits all apply some form of a “more 
discerning” ordinary observer test.97 The reformulated test, dubbed the 
“more discerning ordinary observer test,” requires plaintiffs to prove 
copying of expressive elements; fact finders then must filter 
unprotectable elements out and determine—only based on the remaining 
 
 91. See Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 
1988). This may depend on the amount of material not copied from the plaintiff or perhaps the 
elements in the defendant’s work that the defendant did not copy from the plaintiff. See, e.g., id.; 
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[N]o plagiarist can 
excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”). 
 92. ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT 
LAW § 3:1.1[A] (2020) (footnote omitted).  
 93. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other grounds by 
Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975).  
 94. Id. at 473 & n.22. 
 95. See id. at 473. 
 96. See id.  
 97.   Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing 
Substantial Similarity in a  Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1375, 1391–97 (2007). 
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protectable elements—whether the overall look and feel of the works are 
substantially similar.98 As Part II shows, the modified test has become the 
nation’s de facto test for substantial similarity.99  
The fuzzy limits between protectable and unprotectable elements have 
made substantial similarity a treacherous terrain to navigate. Substantial 
similarity excludes ideas,100 scènes à faire,101 and ideas that have limited 
means of expression, otherwise known as the merger doctrine.102 Other 
limitations, such as the uncopyrightability of colors, letters, and 
geometric forms, overlap with or are contained within these three main 
categories.103 Interwoven within the idea/expression dichotomy, scènes à 
faire, and the merger doctrine, modern courts must also consider both the 
quantitative significance of the copied material and the importance of the 
content copied in the plaintiff’s work.104 According to Judge Learned 
Hand, “no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond 
copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression.’ Decisions must 
therefore inevitably be ad hoc.”105  
As far back as 1987, Professor Amy Cohen warned that the concept 
of substantial similarity itself has become more, rather than less, 
ambiguous as it has been subjected to judicial interpretation over the 
years.106 Tests like the more discerning ordinary observer test require 
courts to dissect a work for comparison without providing an adequately 
theorized means of doing so. This necessarily makes every case the 
decision maker’s value judgment, rendering cases unmoored in 
 
 98. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 265, 268–69, 272–73 (2d Cir. 2001) (considering 
elements of a copyrighted quilt taken from the public domain). 
 99. The Fourth Circuit compares the works through the eyes of their “intended audience.” 
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990). Since copyrighted works are 
usually intended for the public at large, the intended audience and the ordinary observer are 
therefore typically the same. See id. at 734. 
 100. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[I]deas, concepts, and the like 
found in the common domain are the inheritance of everyone.”).  
 101. Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[E]lements of 
a work that are ‘indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic’—like 
cowboys, bank robbers, and shootouts in stories of the American West—get no protection.” 
(quoting Hoehling v. Univeral City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980))).  
 102. Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(“[W]hen an idea can be expressed in very few ways, copyright law does not protect that 
expression, because doing so would confer a de facto monopoly over the idea. In such cases idea 
and expression are said to be merged.”).  
 103. See Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 132 
(2d Cir. 2003). 
 104. See Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 
1287, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 105. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 106. Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of 
Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 722–23 (1987).  
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standardless precedents and difficult for attorneys to evaluate.107 It is also 
difficult for juries to determine infringement.108  
Far from being a defect, the genius of Arnstein lay in its requirement 
for holistic comparisons. Arnstein simply required a comprehensive side-
by-side comparison of the works to see if enough was misappropriated, a 
task simple enough that the court was satisfied jurors could do.109 
Arnstein’s jury-centered inquiry also grounds the technical inquiry in a 
lay audience’s perception rather than the technical sensibilities of an 
expert blended with the rarified tastes of judges imbibing the works from 
their chambers. Defendants could then argue that what they copied was 
unprotectable—a finding courts are well accustomed to making.110  
b.  Who Should Judge Substantial Similarity? 
Arnstein’s second crucial contribution was about who should judge 
substantial similarity. The court stated “[s]urely, then, we have an issue 
of fact which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine.”111 The court noted:  
The impression made on the refined ears of musical experts 
or their views as to the musical excellence of plaintiff’s or 
defendant’s works are utterly immaterial on the issue of 
misappropriation; for the views of such persons are caviar to 
the general [public]—and plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
compositions are not caviar.112  
Since judges are unlikely to listen to popular music, they should rely on 
a jury.113 Similarly, it would “be proper to exclude tone-deaf persons 
from the jury,” as they would not be typical consumers of musical 
works.114 The opinion also noted the appropriateness of denying 
summary judgment when “there is the slightest doubt as to the facts,” and 
it stressed the importance of in-court cross-examination.115 
Judge Clark wrote a sharp dissent arguing that the majority was 
creating “chaos, judicial as well as musical,” and defending the propriety 
 
 107. See Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1338 (2012) 
(“[S]ubstantial similarity can become confusing for even experienced attorneys and judges . . . .”). 
 108. Id. (“The empirical research casts concerns as to how judges and juries may adjudicate 
such situations of artistic uncertainty.”). 
 109. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other 
grounds by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 110. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (noting that the idea of bookkeeping 
would not be copyrightable). 
 111. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
 112. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. at 473 n.22. 
 115. Id. at 468–70 (quoting Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 
(2d Cir. 1945)).  
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of judges deciding the issue on summary judgment.116 He was skeptical 
about the jury’s ability to identify improper appropriation: 
I should not have thought it pre-eminently fitted to decide 
questions of musical values, certainly not so much so that an 
advisory jury should be brought in if no other is available. 
And I should myself hesitate to utter so clear an invitation to 
exploitation of slight musical analogies by clever musical 
tricks in the hope of getting juries hereafter in this circuit to 
divide the wealth of Tin Pan Alley.117 
Judge Clark would also have allowed dissection and expert testimony, 
since “[m]usic is a matter of the intellect as well as the emotions; that is 
why eminent musical scholars insist upon the employment of the 
intellectual faculties for a just appreciation of music.”118 As Section II.B 
shows, Judge Clark’s dissenting view took root and likewise had 
disastrous consequences for plaintiffs in the decades to come.119  
Pretrial motions are a particularly inappropriate means to dispose of a 
substantial similarity argument. The underlying facts and the weight of 
inferences are likely to be in dispute. The mixed question should be 
treated as more like a question of fact (and thus for the jury) than one of 
law (and thus for the judge, including at summary or final judgment once 
the jury has provided its fact-finding). One judge’s opinion on inference 
in the substantial similarity analysis may not reflect the consensus 
opinion of a jury.120 Pretrial motions may foreclose plaintiffs from 
realizing an otherwise meritorious cause of action. A judge who disposes 
of a substantial similarity argument on a pretrial motion runs a real risk 
of ignoring the wide disparity of opinion that arises in the fact-finding 
process in understanding of lay juror perceptions of similarity.  
c.  How Broadly Should a Plaintiff’s Economic Interests Extend? 
Arnstein’s third crucial contribution is what substantial similarity 
would cover. Arnstein was a composer but sought relief against Porter’s 
phonorecords and public performances of his plagiarized works.121 They 
were not direct rivals. In other words, the Arnstein test looked at both the 
economic and technical aspects of the similarities.122 In contrast to the 
technical aspects discussed above, the economic aspects focus more on 
whether the parties are rivals. Where the defendant used the entire work 
 
 116. Id. at 480 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 479. 
 118. Id. at 476.  
 119. See infra Section II.B.  
 120. See infra Section III.C.2. 
 121. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467. 
 122. See id. at 469, 473. 
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or made an identical copy, there is no need to compare the parties’ works 
in a substantial similarity analysis.123 Where the works have similar 
expressive elements, this general similarity in “total concept and feel” 
could include defendants who copied plot elements and characters from 
a play into a motion picture.124  
The amount and substantiality of the defendant’s copying are the third 
factor in the fair-use analysis, and courts sometimes avoid a substantial 
similarity analysis by finding that what the defendant copied was fair 
use.125 In this regard, fair use is simply another way of defining what 
conduct is not infringing. Copyright law gives authors temporary market 
exclusivity to recoup their investments and profit from their creativity.126 
This encourages further creativity both from those authors and from 
others enticed by the promise of a reward.127 The copyright system 
therefore enables copyright owners to reallocate those rights in two ways: 
through licenses and by allowing others to use the work through 
consuming the work or by building on it.128 The Copyright Act thus 
includes the right “to prepare derivative works based [on] the copyrighted 
work.”129 Indeed, since derivative work rights and substantial similarity 
both focus on nonliteral infringement, they are two ways of asking the 
same critical question about the point at which copying becomes 
inappropriate. As this Article shows in Section II.C, later courts, perhaps 
confounded with the difficulty of applying the convoluted technical tests 
 
 123. E.g., Range Rd. Music, Inc. v. E. Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
 124. E.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th 
Cir. 1970)), overruled by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc); see 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 125. See, e.g., SOFA Ent., Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273, 1278–80 (9th Cir. 
2013). Courts also may find that the use was minimal, and therefore noninfringing. See, e.g., VMG 
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 880, 887 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 126. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Judicial Review and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure, 2 J. 
ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 33, 35–36 (2003). 
 128. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Rules and Standards in Copyright, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 583, 590 
(2014) (identifying the consumptive and productive uses of a copyrighted work); see also 
Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 
317, 335 (2009) (defining “‘consumptive’ infringement” as “infringement involving the 
reproduction and distribution of copies that are either exact or near enough so that they are almost 
certain to compete with the original work for patronage” (emphasis omitted)). 
 129. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2); id. § 101 (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial 
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an 
original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”). 
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of their own making, focused instead on the more accessible economic 
aspects, leading to plaintiffs’ win rates plummeting.130 
While the Second Circuit significantly altered Arnstein’s ordinary 
observer test, it mostly heeded Arnstein’s warning against employing 
expert evidence in the court’s substantial similarity test.131 The Ninth 
Circuit had no such qualms; in Sid & Marty Krofft Television 
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,132 it further pushed substantial 
similarity from being a standard to being a structured rule.133 
2.  The Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test 
Ostensibly, the judges in Sid & Marty were concerned that “copying” 
and “substantial similarity” might result in liability when defendants only 
took nonprotected ideas.134 It decided to introduce a two-step procedure 
that would first determine whether defendants took only ideas—a test it 
called “extrinsic because it depends not on the responses of the trier of 
fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed” by experts 
if necessary.135 Second, it would determine whether substantial similarity 
existed between the expressions—a test labeled “intrinsic” because it 
“depend[s] on the response of the ordinary reasonable person” rather than 
“the type of external criteria and analysis which marks the extrinsic 
test.”136 Plaintiffs would win if they satisfied both the extrinsic and 
intrinsic tests, so if either favored the defendant there would be no 
infringement.137 The Ninth Circuit uses this “total concept and feel”138 
test “to restrict the scope of a plaintiff’s copyright from extending to 
(unprotectable) ideas.”139 In a nod to Arnstein, it targets the subjective 
quality of the work as its “intended audience” perceives.140 
According to Sid & Marty, “This same type of bifurcated test was 
announced” in Arnstein, and the “unlawful appropriation” in Arnstein’s 
second prong meant only taking protected expression rather than 
 
 130. See infra Section II.C. 
 131. See Gervais, supra note 8, at 608–10 (contrasting the Second Circuit where expert 
testimony is occasionally used with the Ninth Circuit where expert testimony is “frequently 
utilized”). 
 132. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), overruled by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 
(9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). 
 133. Id. at 1164. 
 134. See id. at 1162–63. 
 135. Id. at 1164. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 138. Jeannette Rene Busek, Comment, Copyright Infringement: A Proposal for a New 
Standard for Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of Possible Expressive Variation, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1777, 1790 (1998). 
 139. Douglas Y’Barbo, The Origin of the Contemporary Standard for Copyright 
Infringement, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 285, 302 (1999). 
 140. Busek, supra note 138, at 1790–91.  
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unprotected ideas.141 At the same time, the opinion declared: “We do not 
resurrect the Arnstein approach today. Rather, we formulate an extrinsic-
intrinsic test for infringement based on the idea-expression dichotomy. 
We believe that the Arnstein court was doing nearly the same thing. But 
the fact that it may not have been does not subtract from our analysis.”142  
Scholars noted a substantial difference between the Second and Ninth 
Circuit tests.143 Whereas under Arnstein misappropriation takes place in 
one step, the Ninth Circuit’s “extrinsic/intrinsic” test splits Arnstein into 
two.144 Plaintiffs must prove substantial similarity under both prongs: 
first, the “extrinsic . . . filtering” of uncopyrightable elements and 
comparison of copyrightable features, and second, “intrinsic” 
requirement that an ordinary, reasonable observer viewing the works as 
a whole would perceive the allegedly infringing work to be substantially 
similar to the plaintiff's work in “total concept and feel.”145 It has proven 
difficult for courts to apply.146 The extrinsic step’s focus on similarity in 
ideas is also odd, given that copyright does not protect ideas.147 The 
Fourth and Eighth Circuits adopted the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic/intrinsic 
test, with the Fourth Circuit refining the second step further by assuming 
the perspective of the “intended audience” of the work as opposed to the 
general public—language that seems similar to the refined ordinary 
observer test and therefore similarly problematic for the plaintiff.148  
3.  The Abstraction/Filtration/Comparison Test 
The third test for substantial similarity is the 
“abstraction/filtration/comparison” test, which the Second Circuit 
 
 141. Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164–65. 
 142. Id. at 1165 n.7. 
 143. See, e.g., Gervais, supra note 8, at 610 (“The Second and Ninth Circuits differ 
substantially.”). 
 144. See id. (comparing Arnstein’s single “improper appropriation” step to the Ninth 
Circuit’s “‘extrinsic’ test aimed at determining whether there exists a substantial similarity in 
underlying ideas” and “‘intrinsic’ test to ascertain whether there exists a substantial similarity in 
the expression of the underlying idea” (quoting Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 
648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 1986))); see also id. (“The first step, under the Ninth Circuit’s 
Krofft test, ‘is focused on a dissective analysis of similarities and differences in expression in the 
works at issue.’” (quoting Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1830)). 
 145. Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cavalier v. 
Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002)), overruled in part by Skidmore v. Led 
Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).  
 146. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 92, § 3:2.1[H] (“The application of the extrinsic 
test . . . is a somewhat unnatural task, guided by relatively little precedent . . . .” (quoting Swirsky 
v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2004))). 
 147. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea . . . .”). 
 148. See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733–36 (4th Cir. 1990); OSTERBERG 
& OSTERBERG, supra note 92, §§ 3:2.1–2.3.  
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devised to evaluate cases involving computer software.149 Decades after 
Arnstein, in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,150 the 
Second Circuit noted that while Arnstein is useful “when the material 
under scrutiny [is] limited to art forms readily comprehensible and 
generally familiar to the average lay person,” the “highly complicated and 
technical subject matter at the heart of [nonliteral software] claims” called 
for a different approach because the internal designs of computer 
programs were “likely to be somewhat impenetrable by lay observers.”151 
The test first identifies elements copyright does not protect, using an 
abstraction step—from the general idea to the precise words, images, or 
sounds used in the work.152 The second step filters out these elements, 
and the third step compares protected aspects of both works.153 Each step 
requires the fact finder to dissect what is protectable and what is not, and 
expert testimony may be relevant in all three steps.154 
In Altai, a dispute arose out of two functionally similar computer 
programs developed by different companies.155 The Second Circuit 
parsed the software into its parts: source and object code, parameter lists, 
services required, and outlines.156 It then removed nonprotected parts, 
those either in the public domain or that constituted an idea rather than 
an expression of an idea, such as the link set in the desktop taskbar.157 
Finally, the court compared the remaining expressive elements of the 
plaintiff’s program and found no copying of protectable elements.158 
William Patry criticized the abstraction/filtration/comparison test as 
“the most complicated copyright ‘test’ ever conceived” that misses 
essential holistic elements of artistic works by the “ravage[s]” of element-
by-element analysis.159 Others questioned its usefulness when applied to 
other works of authorship.160 While most circuits reserve this test for 
 
 149. See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–11 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 150. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 151. Id. at 713. 
 152. See id. at 706–07. 
 153. Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996); Altai, 
982 F.2d at 710 (“Once a court has sifted out all the elements of the allegedly infringed program 
which are ‘ideas’ or are dictated by efficiency or external factors, or taken from the public domain, 
there may remain a core protectable expression. In terms of a work’s copyright value, this is the 
golden nugget.”). 
 154. Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1838. 
 155. Altai, 982 F.2d at 698–700. 
 156. See id. at 714. 
 157. See id. at 707, 715. 
 158. Id. at 715, 721. 
 159. 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:94, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 
2020). 
 160. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691, 698 (1999) (“[O]ne cannot 
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computer software cases, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits reportedly apply it 
to all copyright works.161 
In sum, unlike in typical circuit splits, circuits appear divided less by 
the proper policy goals of substantial similarity and more by the 
mechanics of operationalizing those goals. According to the modern 
substantial similarity tests, courts are correct to filter out unprotected 
elements of the plaintiff’s work since defendants can only infringe on 
“protected expression.”162 In doing so, courts must take care to allow 
copyrightable combinations of otherwise unprotectable elements.163 Only 
then do defendants need to show they independently created the allegedly 
infringing work, or that the amount of the protectable material used was 
so trivial that the law should regard it as a noninfringing de minimis 
use.164 Plaintiffs are forced to use this morass of unclear precedent to 
convince courts that defendants have taken only copyrightable content, 
which, as Section II.B shows, would combine with pretrial motion 
practice to create a structural bias against them.  
Circuit courts disagree on how to apply these tests.165 If courts 
struggle to implement their tests, and if both creators and users cannot 
predictably judge their legal positions, the time may now be ripe for the 
Supreme Court to step in and finally introduce a nationwide test.166 In the 
meantime, judges, scholars, and practitioners continue to lack the 
knowledge to meaningfully reform substantial similarity because many 
of its most important facets are hidden and are revealed only empirically. 
Every case is fact-specific, eliding rote application of formulaic or 
mechanistic rules; stepping back to see how the pieces from many cases 
fit together reveals significant trends and truths. 
  
 
divide a visual work into neat layers of abstraction in precisely the same manner one could with 
a text.”). 
 161. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 92, §§ 3:3.1–3.2. 
 162. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
 163. See, e.g., Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington Homes, Inc., 858 F.3d 1093, 1099, 1101–
02 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 164. See, e.g., VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 165. See, e.g., Hickey, supra note 8, at 688–89 (“[E]ven within a single circuit, courts 
sometimes vary the test used depending on the type of work at issue (e.g., software vs. visual 
art).”).  
 166. Roodhuyzen, supra note 10, at 1418–19; see also id. at 1377 (“As the tests become 
increasingly elusive for both courts and litigants, it is important to consider whether there should 
be one single test articulated by the Supreme Court, or rather, whether there should be a test at 
all.”). 
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C.  Looking Under the Hood 
In trademark infringement cases, judges routinely rely on a 
remarkably limited number of factors in reaching their conclusions.167 
They employ heuristics—such as the three substantial similarity tests—
to cut through what would otherwise be a morass of information that 
could paralyze decision-making entirely.168 This, however, makes it 
difficult to draw broader conclusions that inform future cases 
coherently.169 To address this, scholars employ case content analysis to 
parse through court decisions and study how judges and juries apply rules 
to facts in practice.170 
This Article employs case content analysis, relying on an expansive 
pool of cases based on a Westlaw search for all intellectual property law 
cases discussing substantial similarity between 2010 and 2019.171 The 
search returned 285 unfiltered decisions. After filtering out trademark or 
patent cases, as well as copyright cases mentioning but not discussing 
substantial similarity, the final pool comprised 242 cases.172 The dataset 
of hand-coded cases include the decision’s date; the judicial circuit; 
whether the case repeated; its procedural posture; the type of work of 
authorship; substantial similarity tests and their limitations; whether a 
district or appellate court decided the case; case outcomes; the identity of 
 
 167. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1602 (2006) (“The data collected for this study support 
both the general hypothesis that decision makers, even when making complex decisions, consider 
only a small number of factors and the more specific hypothesis that, in doing so, decision makers 
use a core attributes heuristic.”).  
 168. See, e.g., Daryl Lim, Retooling the Patent-Antitrust Intersection: Insights from 
Behavioral Economics, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 124, 175 (2017).  
 169. See, e.g., Daryl Lim, The (Unnoticed) Revitalization of The Doctrine of Equivalents, 
ST. JOHN’S LAW REV. (forthcoming 2021).  
 170. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1371, 1380 (2010) (“Content analysis is capable of helping scholars verify, analyze, or 
refute empirical claims about case law, and it is to that purpose the approach is put in this study.”). 
For earlier studies where others and I employed a similar methodology, see DARYL LIM, PATENT 
MISUSE AND ANTITRUST LAW 10 (2013); Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content 
Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 77–79 (2008); Daryl Lim, Judging 
Equivalents, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 223, 230 (2020); Lee Petherbridge et al., The 
Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 
1303–04 (2011).  
 171. See WESTLAW, next.westlaw.com (search the following terms: “adv: SY,DI (substantial 
/3 similarity)”; then narrow search results to cases between 2010 and 2019; then narrow search 
results to the “Intellectual Property” practice area). For other studies employing a similar 
methodology, see, for example, John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of 
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 963 (2007) (“[W]e collected every district 
court and court of appeals decision on the doctrine of equivalents that appeared in Westlaw . . . .”).  
 172. If the opinion discussed the relevant law and facts, it was included in the database, even 
absent a specific heading. 
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appellate judges and district courts; and the parties’ relationship as rivals 
(or not).  
In 2013, Katherine Lippman published a student comment reporting 
on a more limited set of variables in substantial similarity caselaw.173 The 
Lippman study reported on appellate cases between 1923 and 2011 and 
district court opinions that resulted in reported appeals.174 This had the 
unfortunate consequence of omitting a significant number of district court 
opinions which were not appealed—between 80%–90% of all district 
court cases are never appealed.175 Nonetheless, a large number of cases 
in the Lippman study (234) provides a useful basis for comparison,176 and 
leading copyright scholars have cited the study’s results with approval.177 
This Article builds on the Lippman study and significantly refines it. 
Using an original hand-coded dataset, in addition to all appellate cases 
between 2010 and 2019, this Article reports on all district court opinions 
during that period, regardless of whether parties appealed. This Article 
also introduces other vital refinements, including distinguishing between 
procedural wins (for instance, defeating a motion for summary judgment) 
and substantive wins (which result in a finding of infringement or 
noninfringement) based on substantial similarity. Other refinements are 
the interactions between similarity, rivalry and fair use, and interactions 
between outcomes and the circuit standards employed (and their 
limitations).178  
Substantial similarity—like patent law’s doctrine of equivalents and 
trademark law’s multifactor likelihood of confusion test—uses nonliteral 
analysis to determine infringement in the sense that the offending article 
need not be identical to the plaintiff’s work of authorship, invention, or 
sign.179 The three types of intellectual property rights are, of course, also 
 
 173. Lippman, supra note 8, at 516.  
 174. Id. at 535. Lippman picked the year 1923 because of Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 
959 (2d Cir. 1923), which she regarded as “the oldest case” the substantial similarity test traced 
its roots to. Id. at 549; see also Eric Rogers, Comment, Substantially Unfair: An Empirical 
Examination of Copyright Substantial Similarity Analysis Among the Federal Circuits, 2013 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 896 (“This Note builds upon Lippman’s work by assigning ‘hard numbers’ 
to the results of substantial similarity cases at the appellate level, while determining how selected 
variables influence case outcomes.”). 
 175. Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further 
Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 659–60 
(2004).  
 176. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 535. 
 177. See, e.g., Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994–2014, 101 IOWA L. 
REV. 1065, 1070 n.13 (2016); Zahr K. Said, A Transactional Theory of the Reader in Copyright 
Law, 102 IOWA L. REV. 605, 621 nn.70, 72 (2017); Avani Mehta Sood, Attempted Justice: 
Misunderstanding and Bias in Psychological Constructions of Criminal Attempt, 71 STAN. L. 
REV. 593, 673 n.302 (2019). 
 178. See infra Part II. 
 179. See infra notes 214, 297 and accompanying text. Professor Sarnoff provided this insight. 
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different in significant ways. With substantial similarity, courts 
determine what is copyrighted and what is copied jointly. In contrast, 
patent law’s doctrine of equivalents helps ensure the patent scope is 
commensurate with what patentees ought to receive in their claims. And 
trademark law focuses on the similarity of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
marks and on defendants’ willful infringement in determining the 
likelihood of confusion.180 Nonetheless, like in zoology, knowing how a 
member of an animal species behaves and why it has resisted the decline 
seen in other species in the same genus can help broaden one’s 
understanding of the law beyond niche areas and promote cross-
fertilization of insights. This Article discusses these insights in Part III.  
For this Article, Excel was initially used to hand-code the data before 
converting it to IBM SPSS Statistics to generate the graphs and crosstabs. 
Like all empirical studies, this one has its caveats. There are several well-
recognized limitations to case content study databases. First, coding may 
result in incomplete or inaccurate coding, despite cross-coding and 
verification using a population sample.181 Given, however, that the focus 
is on features of written decisions, the data remain valid as long as they 
are recognized to refer to a specific population rather than a sample of all 
cases in all possible worlds.182 Second, legal databases such as Westlaw 
are known to underreport jury decisions.183 To some degree, comparing 
this study to others that employ similar methods to control for that feature 
can mitigate it.  
Like earlier empirical studies employing the case content analysis 
method, this study avoids regression analysis because “invariance 
produces enormous regression coefficients and standard errors that 
severely limit the utility of the regression results.”184 Instead, this Article 
employs the Fisher Exact Test for contingency tables to test the null 
hypothesis that a case attribute is independent of case outcome.185 This 
contingency table approach is more appropriate than regression because 
 
 180. See infra Section III.A–B; Beebe, supra note 167, at 1582 (stating that in trademark 
law, a finding that the similarity of the marks factor that does not result in a likelihood of confusion 
is dispositive). 
 181. See, e.g., Lim, supra note 169.  
 182. Id.  
 183. Allison & Lemley, supra note 171, at 963–64 (“The universe of all decisions is of course 
different from the universe of those reported in Westlaw, and in particular our study underreports 
jury decisions. But our focus on written decisions (both reported and unreported) allows us to 
parse the grounds for decision and the reasoning of the opinions.”).  
 184. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 167, at 1600 & n.85 (noting “[r]egression analysis is 
inappropriate” for these studies, raising “the problem of ‘zero cell count’ in which the dependent 
variable, here, the outcome of the multifactor test, is invariant for one or more values of an 
independent variable”).  
 185. See Appendix (June 2020), https://bit.ly/SPSSdataset_June2020 [https://perma.cc/ 
7TMF-QT7K].  
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the outcomes and attributes are all categorical variables. Furthermore, the 
Fisher Exact Test is more relevant than a chi-squared test because many 
of the cells have expected counts less than five.186 This study calculates 
Monte Carlo p-values with 50,000 samples. Finally, the reported data are 
kept to whole numbers without decimal places, following the convention 
in other empirical studies.187  
Analysis of judicial opinions has well-known limitations.188 Statistics 
fail to account for extralegal factors influencing judging, such as 
summary affirmances, the state of the record on appeal, and judicial 
deliberations discussed in the opinion.189 Litigants may consider the 
expertise and reputation of the district court judge in deciding whether to 
appeal, introducing selection bias effects into the appellate data.190 
Moreover, most cases settle, so decided cases are a nonrandom subset of 
all cases.191 
The complexity of copyright litigation also makes it difficult to 
generalize, even from a study covering hundreds of cases.192 Parties are 
not randomly distributed throughout the judicial districts.193 Some district 
courts may hear more cases that eventually settle or were filed based on 
 
 186. See G.H. Freeman & J.H. Halton, Note on an Exact Treatment of Contingency, 
Goodness of Fit and Other Problems of Significance, 38 BIOMETRIKA 141, 142, 149 (1951); Sture 
Holm, A Simple Sequentially Rejective Multiple Test Procedure, 6 SCANDINAVIAN J. STAT. 65, 65 
(1979). 
 187. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1161, 1180–82 (2010) (utilizing only whole percentages to reflect data); Ryan T. Holte 
& Ted Sichelman, Cycles of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV. 107, 158 tbl.4 (2019) (same); see 
also TJ Cole, Too Many Digits: The Presentation of Numerical Data, 100 ARCHIVES DISEASE 
CHILDHOOD 608, 609 (2015) (“The general principle is to use two or three significant digits for 
effect sizes, and one or two significant digits for measures of variability.”). 
 188. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1128–29 (2004) 
(discussing unobserved reasoning, strategic behavior, and selection bias).  
 189. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that 
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1899 
(2009).  
 190. David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 243 (2008). 
 191. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 
273 tbls.4 & 5, 274 tbl.6 (2006) (finding that between 65%–68% of all patent cases filed in three 
particular years were resolved via settlement or probable settlement). 
 192. See Petherbridge, supra note 170, at 1380 (noting biases inherent in this approach, such 
as “unobserved reasoning, selection bias, and strategic behavior”); David L. Schwartz, Explaining 
the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1188 (2011) (“Because 
patent litigation as a whole is so complex, it is incredibly complicated to develop and test 
empirical models.”). 
 193. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 924–26, 930 (2001).  
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domicile.194 Therefore, “district court judges are not assigned a random 
sample . . . of patent lawsuits, because district court judges are assigned 
cases from the judicial district in which they sit.”195 A particular judge or 
jury may cause a case to settle, while the same case before a different 
judge or jury could end up on appeal.196 This Article focuses on how 
appellate and lower courts interpret precedent. Indeed, those 
interpretations are not uniform and cannot ever be.197 
Another limitation concerns case outcomes. The Priest-Klein 
“selection hypothesis” predicts that, given various conditions, plaintiff 
win rates at trials should approach 50%, because only close cases survive 
settlement or summary adjudication.198 To be true, the hypothesis 
assumes parties have equal stakes in the litigation.199 More recent studies, 
including those dealing specifically with intellectual property law, cast 
the 50% hypothesis in doubt.200 Professors Ryan Holte and Ted 
Sichelman note that “changes in litigation budgets, attorney quality, and 
other unobservable factors” may have changed the behavior of parties 
rather than judicial decision-making.201 Moreover, technological quirks 
 
 194. See Schwartz, supra note 190, at 241–42. 
 195. Id. at 242.  
 196. See id. at 242 n.119 (“[I]f [judges] have a really tough case, they can put tremendous 
pressure on the parties to settle so there won’t be an appealable order.” (alterations in original) 
(quoting Eric Herman, Charting the Yays and Nays in Federal Court, CHI. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 1, 
10)). 
 197. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Does Empirical Evidence on the Civil Justice System Produce 
or Resolve Conflict?, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 636 (2016) (“[E]ven when the empirical scholars 
completely agree on the underlying facts, interpretation of the results can dramatically differ. 
Empirical legal scholarship is still worth conducting, but the hope that it will resolve partisan 
debates in law is unrealistic.”). 
 198. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6, 17–18 (1984). Priest-Klein’s 50% has been modified when there are different 
stakes involved, for example, if the plaintiff has more to win than the defendant has to lose. See 
Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & Daniel Klerman, Updating Priest and Klein 20–22 (USC Ctr. for L. & Soc. 
Sci., Research Paper No. 15-21, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2619856 [https://perma.cc/LBV2-UB2H]. 
 199. Priest & Klein, supra note 198, at 24. 
 200. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical 
Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 339 (1990) (testing the 50% hypothesis 
and rejecting it as a description of all civil litigation); see also Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. 
Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1310–12 
(2003) (arguing that the Priest-Klein hypothesis is not borne out by the data in patent cases); Jason 
Rantanen, Why Priest-Klein Cannot Apply to Individual Issues in Patent Cases 5 (Univ. of Iowa 
Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 12-15, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2132810 [https://perma.cc/Q38A-SNAK] (“At best, the Priest-Klein hypothesis only applies 
to the selection of disputes, not the selection of individual issues. Due to the presence of multiple 
issues in patent cases, there is axiomatically no basis for inferring that a patentee would expect a 
fifty-percent chance of winning on each one.”). 
 201. See Holte & Sichelman, supra note 187, at 161.  
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and the nature of the parties result in fact-specific outcomes,202 as might 
many interrelated legal doctrines.203 With these caveats in mind, the 
discussion turns to the theory underlying substantial similarity and to the 
points of departure from conventional wisdom in practice. 
II.  A SILENT DEATH 
Substantial similarity is in unprecedented decline. This Part describes 
how and why.204 In the 1970s, plaintiffs enjoyed remarkable success, 
winning 63% of cases, blowing through even the generous 50% mark.205 
By the 1980s, plaintiffs won 36% of the time.206 The figure fell to 22% 
between 1995 and 2000.207 Like the proverbial canary in a coalmine, 
substantial similarity’s decline might have mirrored a shift in copyright 
law against owners, as the Supreme Court ruled against them on an array 
of issues ranging from copyrightability to fair use.208 Supreme Court 
decisions over the last twenty years have favored plaintiffs in nine out of 
the twelve copyright cases (although the Court did not address the 
substantial similarity doctrine directly),209 with only three decisions 
 
 202. Schwartz, supra note 192, at 1187 (“For example, patent litigation between branded and 
generic drug manufacturers differs from patent litigation over a business method patent held by a 
non-practicing entity.”).  
 203. See id. at 1188 (“Changes in precedent can alter lawyers’ behavior in drafting patents. 
Furthermore, changes in precedent can also influence party behavior in litigation.”). 
 204. This abbreviated presentation draws on the extensive analysis in Lim, supra note 33. 
 205. Lippman, supra note 8, at 537; see also supra Section I.C (noting that the Lippman 
dataset only reports on appellate cases and district court cases with appellate opinions).  
 206. Lippman, supra note 8, at 538.  
 207. Id. at 539. 
 208. See id. at 540–41. Out of the five copyright decisions between 1970 and 2010, three 
ruled against the plaintiff. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) 
(holding data compiled in telephone directory uncopyrightable); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 (1984) (holding that time-shifting was fair use); 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994) (holding appropriation of song 
elements in commercialized parody could be fair use); see also Lippman, supra note 8, at 541 
(“[Campbell] may have induced a trend in substantial similarity decisions to construe the 
boundaries of infringement more liberally, absolving more alleged infringers from liability and 
impacting the decline in substantial similarity win rates through the mid-1990s.”); cf. Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (holding that unauthorized 
publication of verbatim excerpts from unpublished memoirs were not fair use); Stewart v. Abend, 
495 U.S. 207, 235–36 (1990) (holding that statutory successors were entitled to renewal rights, 
though the author previously assigned them to another party).  
 209. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 487–88 (2001) (preventing publishers of 
periodicals from relicensing individual articles to databases absent transfer of copyright or any 
rights thereunder from authors of individual articles); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 
(2003) (holding Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 constitutional); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) (holding distributors of device promoting 
infringement liable for third parties’ infringing acts); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 
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favoring defendants.210 This should have been a boom time for plaintiffs; 
it was anything but.  
Plaintiffs won a trifling 11% of cases in the district courts between 
2010 and 2019 (compared to 24% between 1923 and 2011) and 0% on 
appeal between 2010 and 2019 (compared to 32% between 1923 and 
2011).211 Plaintiff win rates on procedure were higher—23% (in district 
court), but only for successfully fending off a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss or summary judgment motion.212 Procedural wins on appeal in 
favor of plaintiffs were at 3%.213 Plaintiff win rates in recent substantial 
similarity cases are meager compared to plaintiff nonliteral infringement 
win rates of 24% in doctrine of equivalence cases (in district court) and 
22% (on appeal).214 They are even lower compared to plaintiff win rates 
in civil litigation, recently around 30%.215  
A.  Three Red Herrings 
Currently, plaintiffs struggle to prove copyright infringement in a way 
never before seen. Neither the tests courts apply, the circuits they reside 
in, nor the works at issue adequately account for this startling finding. 
 
154, 157 (2010) (holding that registration requirement does not restrict federal court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction for infringement suits involving unregistered works); Golan v. Holder, 565 
U.S. 302, 306–08 (2012) (holding that protection for preexisting works of Berne member 
countries in country of origin, but not in the United States, is constitutional); Am. Broad. Cos. v. 
Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 436 (2014) (holding that provider that sold subscribers broadcast 
television programming streamed over the Internet from small antennas infringed copyright); 
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 667 (2014) (denying a defense of laches 
for damages claims brought within the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations); 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1983 (2016) (holding that a district court 
awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing party should give substantial weight to reasonableness of 
losing party’s position); Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017) 
(holding that a feature in a useful article is eligible for copyright protection and setting out the test 
for eligibility).  
 210. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 525 (2013) (“We hold that the 
‘first sale’ doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad.”); Rimini St., 
Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873, 876 (2019) (holding that federal district courts can award 
“full costs” to party in copyright litigation only in six categories of costs specified by Congress); 
Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 886–87 (2019) (holding 
that a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit when the Copyright Office registers 
a copyright, not when an owner submits application, materials, and registration fee to the Office).  
 211. See Appendix, supra note 185; see also Lippman, supra note 8, at 555 (noting the 
decrease in plaintiff-favorable holdings, especially on appeal).  
 212. See Appendix, supra note 185.  
 213. See Appendix, supra note 185.  
 214. See Lim, supra note 169. 
 215. See Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The Curious Incident of the Falling Win 
Rate: Individual vs System-Level Justification and the Rule of Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1371, 
1373 (2019) (tracking plaintiff win rates in civil litigation).  
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Instead, this Article identifies two factors contributing to this trend: 
pretrial motions and nonrival defendants. 
1.  Variances Between Existing Tests? 
Given the controversy surrounding the existing tests one might expect 
stark variances in plaintiff win rates between them.216 After all, courts 
have shown that they have no consistent way to compare two works, and 
there are other points of disagreement, including whether the baseline to 
assess similarity should be the original work or the accused work.217  
Figure 1 (below) shows test variations across circuits (both at the 
district and appellate levels), clearly establishing the ordinary observer 
test’s dominance in Second Circuit courts, and the extrinsic/intrinsic 
test’s dominance in Ninth Circuit courts. Most circuits track one or the 
other, with the Sixth and Tenth Circuits employing both interchangeably. 
Few courts used the abstraction/filtration/comparison test, and none 
applied more than one test. Surprisingly, the chosen test generally made 
little difference to the outcome.218 Plaintiffs were decimated regardless 
of the tests courts used (see Figure 2 below), even if differences in win 
rates among the application of the tests remain.  
  
 
 216. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 539 (“Such a significant downturn may reflect the impact 
of then-recent decisions that either outlined a new test or applied an old test in a new way.”); see 
also Hickey, supra note 8, at 684 (“Much commentary on substantial similarity defends one of 
the existing tests as superior or proposes to replace the confused doctrine with a new standard.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–66 (1985) 
(using multiple baselines in noting that amount copied was a quantitatively “insubstantial” part of 
the original work but also “13% of the infringing article”); see also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn 
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (rejecting defendants’ work as the baseline to prevent 
plagiarists from “excus[ing] the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate”); cf. 
Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[I]nsignificant infringement may be 
substantial only if the material is qualitatively important to either [the accused] or [the original] 
work.”). 
 218. Lippman, supra, note 8, at 544. Between 1923 and 2011, the breakdown of how often 
each test was used is as follows: ordinary observer test (55%), followed by the extrinsic/intrinsic 
test (28%) and the abstraction/filtration/comparison test (7%). Id.; see also id. at 546 (finding that 
plaintiffs succeeded within a consistent range—the ordinary observer test (33%), the 
extrinsic/intrinsic test (25%), and the abstraction/filtration/comparison test (24%)). Between 2010 
and 2019, the breakdown of success rates is as follows: ordinary observer test (5%); 
extrinsic/intrinsic test (2%). See infra Figure 2. 
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2.  Variances Between Circuits? 
While a few circuits have made significant modifications to their 
central approach, the more discerning observer test is the “dominant 
approach to copyright infringement analysis today.”219 Could the fact that 
the Second Circuit hears most substantial similarity cases be the reason 
for the test’s demise? Intriguingly, outcomes based on circuit variations 
have been remarkably consistent. Between 1923 and 2011, the Second 
Circuit and Ninth Circuit reported comparable win rates at both the trial 
(24% compared to 22%) and appellate levels (33% compared to 34%).220 
Between 2010 and 2019, Second Circuit district courts found for 
plaintiffs in 4.8% of cases, and there were no appellate cases. In the Ninth 
Circuit, plaintiff win rates were 1.4% (in district court) and 8% (on 
appeal), again reflecting a consistently low win rate.221   
 

















3.  Variances Between Works of Authorship? 
With copyright law covering such diverse media types and forms of 
expression, substantial similarity strains at being a one-size-fits-all test. 
Unsurprisingly, the literature is rich with calls for courts to better map 
 
 219. Balganesh, supra note 4, at 794, 796.  
 220. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 545 fig.4; see also id. at 535 (reporting that over 80% of 
the appellate opinions “were issued from 1980 to 2011”).  
 221. See Appendix, supra note 185. 
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substantial similarity tests to the type of work at issue.222 The Copyright 
Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium 
of expression.”223 The Act lists eight categories of protected works: 
literary; musical; dramatic; pantomime and choreographic; pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural; motion picture and other audiovisual; sound 
recording; and architectural.224  
These categories are neither rigid nor closed. For instance, the 
Copyright Act of 1790225 protected only maps, charts, and books.226 
Musical compositions were routinely registered as “books” until the 
Copyright Act was amended in 1831.227 When the computer industry’s 
growth and profitability of mass-marketed software made illicit copying 
of computer programs inexpensive, easy, and prevalent, copyright law 
provided a ready solution.228 Some studies use as few as two categories, 
while others use up to six categories.229 This study uses eight categories 
that best reflect the types of works in the dataset: literary; musical; 
pictorial, graphical, and sculptural; computer programs; factual; 
architectural; dramatic; and cinematographic. 
A seasoned observer of copyright cases would guess that works with 
rich, expressive content, such as literary and musical works, would 
receive more significant protection than databases, computer programs, 
or architectural works, which are factual or functional and, therefore, lie 
closer to the edge of the unprotectable ideas, scènes à faire, or the merger 
doctrine discussed in Section I.B.230 Surprisingly, the data show that this 
is not the case. 
 
 222. See Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1823 (“[C]ourts [should] tailor infringement tests based 
on characteristics of the works at issue.”); Lieberman, supra note 9, at 93–96; Jennifer Understahl, 
Note, Copyright Infringement and Poetry: When Is a Red Wheelbarrow The Red Wheelbarrow?, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 915, 944 (2005); Busek, supra note 138, at 1781; David Nimmer et al., A 
Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright 
Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 638 (1988).  
 223. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 224. Id. § 102(a)(1)–(8). 
 225. Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 226. See id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 124. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Copy in Copyright, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO IM/MATERIAL GOODS 65 (Jessica C. Lai & Antoinette 
Maget Dominicé eds., 2016) (discussing the historical development of American copyright law).  
 227. WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 30 n.91 (2000), as reprinted in 
DIGIT. L. ONLINE, http://digital-law-online.info/patry/patry5.html [https://perma.cc/7CAM-
E38T]. 
 228. Root, supra note 53, at 1291–92.  
 229. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 572 (2008) (looking at “new media” and “traditional two-
dimensional nonvirtual print media”); Rogers, supra note 174, at 926 (dividing six types of subject 
matter into “high-tech subject matter” and “low-tech subject matter”).  
 230. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) 
(“The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction 
or fantasy.”).  
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Figure 4 (below) shows plaintiffs had a higher percentage of wins in 
literary as well as in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works than in the 
other categories of works. However, a closer look reveals that there were 
many more cases in these two categories of works than in the other ones. 
What is more telling, therefore, is the gap between defendant and plaintiff 
win rates. As Figure 5 (below) indicates, the win rates in both of those 
categories are approximately the same as those in computer programs, 
factual, and architectural works. Overall, plaintiffs fared abysmally with 
dramatic works and did surprisingly well with cinematographic works. 
 



















Figure 5: Table Comparing Plaintiff Win Rates by Type of Work 
(1923–2019) 
Type of Work 1923–2011 
Plaintiff Win Rate 
(%) 
2010–2019 
Plaintiff Win Rate (%) 
Literary  20.5 13.6 
Pic., Graph., Sculpt. 52.9 11.5 
Musical 21.4 0.0 
Computer Programs 30.0 12.5 
Factual 39.1 11.8 
Architectural  8.3 11.1 
Dramatic Not reported 0.0 
Cinematographic  Not reported 28.6 
35
Lim: Saving Substantial Similarity
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
626 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
Given the demise of substantial similarity, the odds are generally 
stacked against plaintiffs.231 The truth behind the high percentage of 
plaintiff wins in cinematographic work is less dramatic than it appears at 
first glance. The dataset reported only fourteen cases (out of 210 district 
court opinions). The four cases finding in favor of plaintiffs skew the 
actual likelihood of plaintiff wins. It is worth noting that, in 2010, a 
leading entertainment litigator observed that copyright infringement 
“claims against motion picture studios and television networks, for all 
intents and purposes, are dead.”232  
Putting to rest three common reasons for case outcomes merely begs 
the question—what killed substantial similarity? The Lippman study 
provides a critical clue. According to it, 55% of cases where the plaintiff 
won were bench and jury trials.233 In contrast, it observed that only 14% 
of such trials ended up favoring alleged infringers.234 Summary judgment 
motions flip the picture, making up only 3% of plaintiff wins, but a 
whopping 51% of defendant wins.235 The Lippman study concluded that 
“a defendant-favorable district court decision finding that the works are 
not substantially similar is less likely to be overturned on appeal because, 
in most cases, that decision was made at the summary judgment stage; 
and, presumably, the case is weak or frivolous.”236 
While plausible, concluding that pretrial motion dismissals equate to 
plaintiffs bringing weak or frivolous cases is unsatisfying. The fact is, at 
least as a matter of litigation burden, defendants have it easier. They need 
only show that plaintiffs failed to make out their case on the pleadings, 
specifically a lack of substantial similarity, for instance, through the 
copying of unprotected elements. By contrast, plaintiffs must satisfy a 
gamut of factual and legal issues to prevail. Moreover, the evidentiary 
requirements under summary judgment are lower than at trial. A more 
robust answer therefore needs to consider how courts make substantial 
similarity determinations. 
Over the years, courts and commentators continued to praise the 
centrality of juries.237 In theory, this would safeguard plaintiffs against 
 
 231. Lippman, supra note 8, at 522 (observing a “concern that case law is sharply skewed in 
favor of the defendants”).  
 232. Steven T. Lowe, Death of Copyright, L.A. LAW., Nov. 2010, at 32, 32; see also 
Lippman, supra note 8, at 520–21 (“In the last twenty years, all forty-eight copyright infringement 
lawsuits against motion picture studios and television networks within the Second and Ninth 
Circuits and their district courts resulted in defendant victories.”). 
 233. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 556. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 557 (footnote omitted). 
 237. See Loren & Reese, supra note 1, at 646 (“Substantial similarity is a question of fact.”); 
Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 319, 
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defendants seeking quick disposal of the case on a motion to dismiss or 
summary judgment motion.238 This Article reveals a surprising 
partnership in practice between judges and defendants formed to usurp 
the jury’s role. 
B.  Judicial Usurpers 
Unlawful appropriation rests on the plaintiff’s protectable expression 
and the relevant public’s impression—for whose benefit copyright exists 
in the first place.239 For this reason, Arnstein placed juries at the center of 
its test for substantial similarity.240 Part I emphasizes that a jury is 
“peculiarly fitted to determine” the response of the lay hearer.241  
At the same time, defendants may bring motions for summary 
judgment, inviting judges to make favorable and expedient 
determinations.242 When this happens, judges may rule on substantial 
similarity as a matter of law if defendants offer sufficient evidence in their 
pleadings that no reasonable jury could find unlawful appropriation.243 
Courts have also extended this practice to defendants’ motions to 
 
351 (2013) (“[A] showing of substantial similarity is a question of fact . . . .”); see also Shaw v. 
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that summary judgment is “not highly 
favored” on questions of substantial similarity in copyright cases (quoting Narell v. Freeman, 872 
F.2d 907, 909–10 (9th Cir. 1989))), overruled by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th 
Cir. 2020) (en banc); Oren Bracha & John M. Golden, Redundancy and Anti-Redundancy in 
Copyright, 51 CONN. L. REV. 247, 275 (2019) (“[T]he substantial similarity standard . . . is applied 
case by case and often by juries . . . .”); Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 
602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[Q]uestions of non-infringement have traditionally been reserved 
for the trier of fact.”).  
 238. See, e.g., TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 968 F. Supp. 2d 588, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(denying motion to dismiss copyright claim against defendant who used the lyrical phrase and 
recording “say what” sampled from plaintiff’s song); Herzog v. Castle Rock Ent., 193 F.3d 1241, 
1247 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that courts historically have been reluctant to make subjective 
determinations in copyright cases regarding the similarity between two works on summary 
judgment); Osterberg, supra note 51.  
 239. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other grounds 
by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Balganesh, supra 
note 4, at 794 (“[C]ourts around the country take their guidance on the copyright infringement 
analysis from a landmark decision of the Second Circuit that is believed to have defined the 
structure of the infringement inquiry and the jury’s role in it . . . .”). 
 240. See supra Section I.B. 
 241. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
 242. See, e.g., Boone v. Jackson, 206 F. App’x 30, 31–32 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming summary 
judgment in favor of defendant for the use of lyrical phrase “Holla Back” and noting deposition 
testimony that contradicted plaintiff’s prior assertions). 
 243. See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding 
summary judgment on the ground that no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity). 
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dismiss.244 In an astonishing 62% of cases, judges readily accepted a 
defendant’s invitation to rule on substantial similarity on one motion or 
the other without an iota of jury input.245  
 



















This finding eviscerates conventional wisdom that juries command 
the outcome of infringement cases.246 Figure 7 (below) shows the 
devastating impact of defendant pretrial motions on plaintiff win rates. 
Plaintiffs prevail about 40% of the time when they bring a pretrial motion, 
compared to 74% when defendants bring a summary judgment motion, 
and 76% on a motion to dismiss.247 In the mid-1980s, plaintiff win rates 
fell as the practice became comparatively more prevalent.248 Surely,  
[t]his result raises the possibility that summary judgment on 
the substantial similarity issue may actually decrease the 
 
 244. See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 
2010) (noting that, when evaluating substantial similarity on a motion to dismiss, “no discovery 
or fact-finding is typically necessary, because ‘what is required is only a visual [or aural] 
comparison of the works’” (quoting Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d 
Cir. 1991))).  
 245. See Appendix, supra note 185.  
 246. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 4, at 796–97 (describing Arnstein as giving “juries 
complete control over the question of improper appropriation in the infringement analysis”). 
 247. See Appendix, supra note 185.  
 248. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 554; see also id. at 557 (“[A]n increase in summary 
adjudications coincides with a decline in the frequency of trials, but it also corresponds to a 
decrease in substantial similarity win rates.”). 
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likelihood that a copyright holder will prevail due to the fact 
that the proper test for substantial similarity—which 
“requires the response of the ordinary lay observer,” not the 
judge—is not applied.249  
In theory, the move from cases based on the earlier Copyright Act of 
1909250 may have influenced case outcomes. However, nothing in 
scholarly commentary indicates a material difference in the test courts 
applied. For instance, contemporary cases continued to apply Arnstein, 
decided in 1946, without distinguishing between the relevant Acts.251  
An important related question is whether there are circuit variances in 
this trend. Professor Robert Helfing anecdotally observes this practice in 
the context of the Second and Ninth Circuits. Professor Helfing notes that 
the Second Circuit “has loosened the reins and expressly authorized the 
summary resolution of claims on the basis of a judge’s emotional 
response to works of authorship.”252 In contrast, “The Ninth Circuit has 
been mostly faithful to this judicial restraint.”253 Figure 8 (below) shows 
that Professor Helfing is only partially correct. The Second Circuit 
granted defendants’ summary judgments and motions to dismiss in 67% 
of its caseload.254 In comparison, the Ninth Circuit did so in 66% of its 
caseload.255 
 














 249. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 557 (quoting Julie J. Bisceglia, Summary Judgment on 
Substantial Similarity in Copyright Actions, 16 HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 51, 55–56 
(1993)). 
 250. Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. 
 251. See supra Section I.B. 
 252. Helfing, supra note 10, at 764.  
 253. Id. 
 254. See Appendix, supra note 185.  
 255. See Appendix, supra note 185.  
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It is unlikely that judges intend to impede plaintiffs’ right of access to 
jury trials, but a finding of evidentiary insufficiency blocks the route 
nonetheless. Judges engaging in this practice usually begin with the 
mantra that “a court may make a finding of non-infringement as a matter 
of law on summary judgment if the similarity between the works 
concerns only non-copyrightable elements, or if no reasonable jury, 
properly instructed, would find as to the protectable elements that the two 
works are substantially similar,”256 and then summarily proceed to do 
so.257 Courts themselves have framed this practice as proper as long as a 
court has before it all that is necessary to make such an evaluation.258  
To justify this usurpation of substantial similarity cases, some judges 
touted their expertise. As one judge put it, substantial similarity “is often 
more reliably and accurately resolved in a summary judgment 
proceeding. This is so because a judge is better able to separate original 
expression from the non-original elements of a work where the copying 
of the latter is not protectable and the copying of the former is 
protectable.”259 Another judge declared that “the ‘substantial-similarity’ 
 
 256. Architects Collective v. Pucciano & English, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1343 (N.D. 
Ga. 2017). 
 257. See, e.g., Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Although this 
question typically should be left to the factfinder, summary judgment may be appropriate if the 
court can conclude, after viewing the evidence and drawing inferences in a manner most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, that no reasonable juror could find substantial similarity . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(“[S]ummary judgment for defendant is appropriate where works are so dissimilar that a claim of 
infringement is without merit.”); Home Design Servs., Inc. v. Turner Heritage Homes Inc., 825 
F.3d 1314, 1326 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e stand by the core premise that judges can, in certain 
cases, remove the question of substantial similarity from jury consideration.”). 
 258. See Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 279 F. Supp. 3d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(“Numerous courts in this district have resolved the issue of fair use on a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings by conducting a side-by-side comparison of the works at issue.”), aff’d, 729 F. 
App’x 131 (2d Cir. 2018); Klauber Bros. v. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc., 557 F. App’x 77, 80 (2d Cir. 
2014) (observing how courts routinely decide the issue of substantial similarity as a matter of 
law); see also Wager v. Littell, 549 F. App’x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing that though the 
issue of substantial similarity is frequently a fact issue for jury resolution, “the issue can be 
decided as a matter of law, even at the pleading stage, by examining the four corners of the 
complaint together with the works themselves when ‘no reasonable jury, properly instructed, 
could find that the two works’ are strikingly similar.” (quoting Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC 
v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2010))); Peter F. Gaito, 602 F.3d at 63 (“[I]t 
is entirely appropriate for a district court to resolve that question as a matter of law, ‘either because 
the similarity between two works concerns only non-copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s 
work, or because no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the two works are 
substantially similar.’” (quoting Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 
1983))). 
 259. Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Est. Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 
2008); see also Lieberman, supra note 9, at 94 (“[J]urors are not likely to understand such an 
ephemeral distinction between ideas and expression, especially when applied to areas in which 
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test is more often correctly administered by a judge rather than a jury—
even one provided proper instruction.”260  
What is the basis of that conclusion? Perhaps judges hear copyright 
infringement cases with some regularity and develop an expertise. The 
Supreme Court approved this line of reasoning in patent claim 
construction by giving judges, rather than juries, the benefit of 
determining the scope of rights.261 Another reason may be that judges 
rendering opinions and setting out their reasoning allow for more 
substantive accountability than a binary jury verdict finding for one party 
or the other.262 In the context of patent infringement cases, the Supreme 
Court expressed concerns “over unreviewability due to black-box jury 
verdicts.”263 As a form of “procedural improvement[],” it encouraged 
district courts to grant summary judgment for the defendant where “no 
reasonable jury could determine two elements to be equivalent,” or where 
“legal limitations on the application of the doctrine of equivalents are to 
be determined by the court, either on a pretrial motion for partial 
summary judgment or on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.”264 
Unfortunately, this Article reveals that these justifications are generally 
unsubstantiated.  
1.  The Mirage of Accountability 
On the issue of accountability, scholars have criticized judges for 
using an “I know it when I see it” means to determine substantial 
similarity and have argued that judges should set out for the record their 
reasoning in detail.265 Some courts have defended this practice. One judge 
recently expressed that “[t]he Court need not explain in its analysis every 
alleged similarity in a copyright infringement case and may properly 
disregard alleged similarities that are not protectable.”266  
Substantial similarity turns on inherently subjective appreciation of a 
work’s tone and feel. Resolving it as a matter of law risks one judge’s 
subjective opinion trumping the evidence. Courts may even conclude 
 
they lack expertise, as is often the case with copyright. Because the issue of misappropriation is 
so dependent on the interpretation of these underlying principles of copyright law, classifying the 
issue as purely a question of fact for the jury requires reconsideration.” (footnote omitted)). 
 260. Intervest Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d at 920.  
 261. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388, 391 (1996) (describing 
how precedent would not undercut the deciding Justice’s authority). 
 262. See Lim, supra note 169. 
 263. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997).  
 264. Id. On the doctrine of equivalents, see Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of 
Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1162 (2004).  
 265. E.g., Roodhuyzen, supra note 10, at 1376–77.  
 266. Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2019), rev’d, 821 F. 
App’x 727 (9th Cir. 2020).  
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substantial similarity when comparing two works and use the formalistic 
tests to support their decisions ex post.267  
A recent study on substantial similarity employing a behavioral 
economics framework shows that courts are sensitive to information 
about the two works and their creators in a way that “actively distorts” 
their “assessments of the similarity between the two works, calling into 
question the purported objectivity of the substantial similarity 
requirement as a whole.”268 Even within a single circuit, courts 
employing the same test can reach vastly different conclusions, as the two 
examples below illustrate.  
First, in Copeland v. Bieber,269 the Fourth Circuit had to determine if 
Justin Bieber and Usher’s song “Somebody to Love” was substantially 
similar to the plaintiff’s song with the same name.270 The district court 
concluded that while Bieber and Usher’s song had “some elements in 
common” with the plaintiff’s song, there was a significant difference in 
the overall “aesthetic appeal” of the respective songs.271 The appellate 
court disagreed because “that analysis attaches too much weight to what 
the district court termed a difference in ‘mood’ and ‘tone,’ and too little 
to similarities between the ‘element’ of the songs—their choruses—that 
is most important.”272  
According to the appellate court, by allowing genre differences to 
preclude intrinsic similarity, defendants could profit from unlicensed 
adaptations solely because the work had a different “concept and feel” 
than the original, with a different “aesthetic appeal.”273 This would 
deprive plaintiffs of the full return on their creative efforts in light of what 
the statute prohibits as infringing conduct that is not fair use.274 The 
appellate court also faulted the district court for failing to account for 
qualitatively significant similarities, declaring “it is clear that when it 
comes to popular music, a song’s chorus may be the kind of key sequence 
that can give rise to intrinsic similarity, even when works differ in other 
respects.”275 It proceeded to “conclude that their choruses are similar 
enough and also significant enough that a reasonable jury could find the 
songs intrinsically similar.”276 The problem with this conclusion, 
 
 267. See Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 
473–75, 522 (2015) (noting a “great divergence in outcomes and reasoning . . . in infringement 
analysis” and criticizing judges’ “intuitive” approach). 
 268. See Balganesh et al., supra note 3, at 267.  
 269. 789 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2015).  
 270. Id. at 487. 
 271. Id. at 492. 
 272. Id.  
 273. Id. at 493. 
 274. See id. at 493. 
 275. Id. at 493–94.  
 276. Id. at 494. 
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however, is that juries, not judges, most closely approximate pop music’s 
typical audience. 
Second, in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.,277 both the district and 
appellate courts applied Ninth Circuit precedent for substantial similarity 
to computer code.278 Google copied the thirty-seven Java application 
protocol interfaces (APIs), which Java programmers are required to use 
as a standard requirement for interoperability.279 The district court ruled 
that, since the code was a functional standard the merger doctrine barred 
at the time Google copied the code, there was no infringement.280 It also 
emphasized that Google copied very little code in the context of the 
original work.281  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court’s decision because the code involved creative choices when it was 
written.282 The Federal Circuit also emphasized the total amount copied 
as an absolute matter, referring to the “7,000 lines” of code Google 
copied.283 The view one takes on the issue matters. Critics of the Federal 
Circuit’s approach warn that it “threatens the public’s right to the free 
flow of ideas, the balance at the core of copyright.”284 The view is neither 
that of the original creator nor the alleged infringer but rather the 
objective observer (under any of the three substantial similarity tests or 
under additional tests that would not be based on ordinary observers). 
Indeed, the questionable perspective that the district court and court of 
appeals took only serves to underscore how treacherous this inquiry is.  
 
 277. 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 278. Id. at 1357–58. The district court discussed the principles of the filtration step of the 
abstraction/filtration/comparison test but did not reach the infringement issue directly. See id. at 
1358, 1377. 
 279. Id. at 1350. 
 280. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(“All agree that Google was and remains free to use the Java language itself.”), rev’d, 750 F.3d 
1339. 
 281. Id. at 1001; see also Hickey, supra note 8, at 713 (“In fact, 3% was a generous estimate: 
as both Android and the Java platform writ large contain millions of lines of code, the amount 
copied is quantitatively infinitesimal regardless of which work is used as the measure.”). 
 282. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1361 (“We further find that the district court erred in focusing 
its merger analysis on the options available to Google at the time of copying. It is well-established 
that copyrightability and the scope of protectable activity are to be evaluated at the time of 
creation . . . . The focus is, therefore, on the options that were available to Sun/Oracle at the time 
it created the API packages.”); see also Hickey, supra note 8, at 704 (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s 
approach to the timing problem essentially determined the outcome in Oracle.”). 
 283. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1356, 1359, 1363. 
 284. Hickey, supra note 8, at 724 (“It goes against the core constitutional purpose of 
‘promot[ing] . . . [p]rogress’ for copyright to lock up something as general as an idea, regardless 
of when it attained that status.” (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
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2.  Efficiency vs. Effectiveness 
The second reason judges encourage pretrial motions is efficiency. 
Resources are scarce, and courts justify the need to dispose of cases 
quickly and effectively.285 This way, a trial judge can intercept an issue 
before it gets to the jury.286 As one court put it, a court “not only has the 
discretion, but is in fact required to grant summary adjudication in any 
case where no reasonable fact finder could find equivalence even if 
equivalence is a factual matter normally reserved for the jury.”287 With 
judges intermingling patent and copyright jurisprudence over the years, 
it would be unsurprising that copyright judges have also adopted the 
practice of patent judges in embracing pretrial motions.288  
However, efficiency may come at a dire cost to effectiveness because 
it is impossible for judges to ever see substantial similarity through the 
eyes of a jury. The jury’s factual determination is a safety valve to guard 
against judges cloistered in their courtrooms, becoming arbiters of public 
perception. This judicial usurpation breeds precisely the sort of 
arbitrariness that both courts and copyright scholars complain of.  
Professor Suja Thomas’s work shows divisions between courts will 
be frequent whenever courts substitute their judgment of the facts for a 
jury verdict.289 Judges look at what a single juror would find and thus fail 
to replicate the hive mind of an actual jury; they are unable to account for 
the group decision-making dynamics.290 Professor Thomas concluded 
that judges who attempt to decide dispositive motions based on their 
preconception of what a reasonable jury would find fail and instead 
splinter legal certainty.291 
The need for accountability becomes even more evident when one 
realizes that almost every judge approaches substantial similarity as a 
 
 285. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (“Summary judgment procedure 
is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the 
Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)); see also Hoehling v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[C]ases . . . permit[] courts to put ‘a swift end 
to meritless litigation’ and to avoid lengthy and costly trials.” (quoting Quinn v. Syracuse Model 
Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 1980))).  
 286. PrinterOn Inc. v. BreezyPrint Corp., 93 F. Supp. 3d 658, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2015) 
(“Although infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a fact question, a court may 
determine as a matter of law that the ‘all limitations’ rule, the prior art, or prosecution history 
estoppel preclude the claim.”).  
 287. Dahl v. Swift Distribs., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 976, 982 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  
 288. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 
(2005) (adopting patent law’s contributory infringement jurisprudence).  
 289. See Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 760 
(2009). 
 290. Id. at 770–73. 
 291. See id. at 784. 
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matter of first impression. This Article’s original dataset revealed that 
each judge heard an average of one case per decade.292 District court 
numbers are only marginally better. The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York has the most significant level of expertise 
in substantial similarity. It heard 31% of all district court cases.293 The 
next highest figure, at a distant 7%, came from the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts, and not from any district court in the Ninth 
Circuit.294 However, even in the Southern District of New York, each 
judge heard less than two cases per decade.295 
The nation’s de facto test is Arnstein’s ordinary observer test.296 
Regardless of judge or jury, substantial similarity needs reform to allow 
both lay juries and judges, who likely will encounter it as a matter of first 
impression, to operate effectively. The urgent need for reform only 
increases when one considers that judges, probably overwhelmed by the 
difficulty of applying the tests, alarmingly rely on economic similarities 
rather than technical similarities to dispose of the cases before them. 
Section II.C discusses this issue.  
C.  The Hidden Impact of Fair Use 
The Supreme Court described fair use—a defense to infringement—
as providing a guarantee of “breathing space within the confines of 
copyright,” and it acts as a policy lever for courts to avoid the harshness 
of finding infringement when the circumstances demand it.297 Substantial 
similarity and fair use have much in common.298 Both operate as common 
law doctrines even though Congress provided a statutory basis for fair 
use in the Copyright Act.299 Both present courts with the challenge of 
 
 292. See Appendix, supra note 185. 
 293. See Appendix, supra note 185. 
 294. See Appendix, supra note 185. 
 295. See Appendix, supra note 185. 
 296. See supra Section II.A.  
 297. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also Ann Bartow, 
A Restatement of Copyright Law as More Independent and Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 
457, 471 (2014) (describing how Campbell is the Court’s “most important nonliteral copying fair 
use case” and how it “dial[ed] back the importance of commercial use in a fair use evaluation”).  
 298. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1459, 1480 (“The basic test of substantial similarity for infringement—which is vital for the public 
to evaluate whether its conduct is permissible—is, unfortunately, ‘largely subjective, thus 
permitting the finder of fact to give effect to its intuitive judgment of the perceived equities in a 
case.’ And, of course, the fair use doctrine is notoriously fact-specific, leaving little guidance for 
users of copyrighted works on whether a particular use is fair.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Litman, supra note 8, at 1005)).  
 299. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–07 (stipulating exclusive rights are granted “[s]ubject to” fair 
use); Balganesh, supra note 8, at 215 (“Unlike fair use, which today finds mention in the 
Copyright Act of 1976, substantial similarity continues to remain a doctrine that is policed, 
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applying a single standard across a wide array of works, from software to 
architectural designs.300 Under both analyses, courts consider the purpose 
the defendant seeks to achieve, the harm its copying causes the plaintiff, 
and whether the defendant’s copying amounts to misappropriation.301 
Both fair use and substantial similarity are arbitrary, anecdotal, and 
misunderstood.302 
Most relevant for this Article, however, is the fact that both are 
entrenched in utilitarianism.303 The second fair use factor requires courts 
to examine the “nature of the copyrighted work.”304 In contrast, the third 
factor asks them to consider “the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”305 These are the 
 
enforced, and molded entirely by courts. In this respect it is perhaps more common-law-like than 
fair use, with courts often finding themselves completely free to adapt the doctrine to new contexts 
and technological developments.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 300. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (stating that fair use cannot “be simplified with 
bright-line rules, for the [copyright] statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case 
analysis”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
207, 209 (“[T]he fair-use criteria are so ambulatory that no one can give a general answer.”); 
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Lecture, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1999) (“For all its 
exposure, our understanding of fair use has not progressed much beyond Justice Story’s 
observation [that the fair use doctrine] . . . was ‘one of those intricate and embarrassing 
questions . . . in which it is not . . . easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down 
any general principles applicable to all cases.’” (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901))); Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (recognizing that not all works can be compared 
in the same way); see also Christina Bohannon, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A Modest 
Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
669, 683 (2010) (“[T]he test for infringement of copyright is vague and determinations must be 
made ‘ad hoc.’” (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d 
Cir. 1960))). 
 301. See Balganesh, supra note 8, at 272 (“[T]he fair-use determination—at least as codified 
today—makes use of factors and variables that are legitimately examined as part of the 
substantial-similarity determination.”). 
 302. See Beebe, supra note 229, at 551 (“This affirmative defense represents the most 
important—and amorphous—limitation on the otherwise extraordinarily broad rights granted to 
copyright owners under section 106 of the Act.”); id. at 554 (“[M]uch of our conventional wisdom 
about our fair use case law, deduced as it has been from the leading cases, is wrong.”); see also 
Lippman, supra note 8, at 519 (“It[’s] unclear whether these opinions are representative of the 
substantial similarity doctrine as it is practiced in courts today . . . .”). 
 303. For a discussion of the overlap, see Bracha & Golden, supra note 237, at 275–76. For a 
discussion on utilitarianism in copyright law, see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: 
Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 992 (1990). For a 
discussion on how U.S. copyright law rejects “[p]ersonhood-based or analogous deontic 
theories . . . as incapable of coexisting with the institution’s utilitarian focus,” see Balganesh, 
supra note 8, at 21. 
 304. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
 305. Id. § 107(3). 
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same questions a court faces in a substantial similarity inquiry.306 Indeed, 
for some, the extent of the overlap between substantial similarity and fair 
use begs the question of whether one or the other is redundant.307 In 
focusing on the second and third factors, commentators miss the story 
that the other two factors tell about substantial similarity. 
The first fair use factor requires examination of “the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”308 The fourth fair use factor 
weighs “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”309 Collectively, these factors reference the economic 
impact that the defendant’s work would likely have on the plaintiff, and 
they are the most influential on courts.310 This should not be a part of the 
substantial similarity test, but may have become part of it already. To the 
extent that it has, it suggests that fair use is only the negative of substantial 
similarity and thus noninfringing conduct. 
Fair use regards kindly defendants who reuse the plaintiff’s work in a 
transformative manner. One area is the categories of works courts have 
tended to view as “fair,” such as parodies, other works that infuse the 
original work with new meaning, and the use of the plaintiff’s work in 
news reports, historical research, and comparative advertising.311 These 
classes of works do not compete with copyrighted work but promote 
culture and knowledge.312 Here, scholars can help courts and litigants 
develop substantial similarity jurisprudence using fair use concepts.313 
When rivals copy, they may infringe due to improper appropriation. In 
contrast, nonrivals are more likely to fulfill the constitutional direction 
and be proper. 
Similarly, with regards to infringement, the Second Circuit, in 
formulating the ordinary observer test, reasoned that since a plaintiff’s 
 
 306. Cohen, supra note 106, at 728 (“The degree of similarity between the two works was 
also one of several factors considered in determining the broader equitable defense of fair use. 
The fair use doctrine also considered the type of work involved and the way that the defendant 
had used that work.”). 
 307. See id. at 745 (“A final problem with the traditional approach to copyright infringement 
is the confusing overlap it creates with the fair use doctrine.”); Balganesh, supra note 8, at 272 
(“[H]aving courts reconsider some of the same issues that they did under their preliminary 
analysis of the entitlement seems highly redundant and palpably illogical.”). 
 308. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).  
 309. Id. § 107(4).  
 310. Lydia Pallas Loren, Law, Visual Art, and Money, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1331, 
1349 (2018) (“[T]hose two factors turn out to be the most important . . . .”). 
 311. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2544–46 
(2009). 
 312. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property 
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1300–01 (2014). 
 313. See id. at 1301 (“Copyright’s hybrid audience, then, is intimately related not only to its 
infringement analysis but also to the fair-use doctrine.”). 
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legally protected interest lies in its potential financial returns from its 
work, the work’s audience should make the substantial similarity 
determination.314 The problem is that the modern courts rely too much on 
market effects and too little on the visual or aural similarities between the 
works at issue. 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly315 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,316 the 
Supreme Court set out when judges should accept, infer, or presume 
causality.317 The touchstone is plausibility.318 Judges relying on 
utilitarianism may lean on the lack of market effects to find against 
plaintiffs rather than have to wrangle with complex tests the circuit courts 
use to determine technical similarities. As discussed earlier, that skew 
would be symptomatic of the difficulty of applying any of the substantial 
similarity tests as they exist today. It would also evidence courts’ 
desperate latching onto market effects as a heuristic that both 
conveniently comports with copyright’s utilitarian policy stance and is 
simple enough to employ across diverse industries by judges 
inexperienced in dealing with substantial similarity.   
To some degree, every creator uses preexisting material that others 
created. An emphasis on utilitarianism may lead courts to side with 
plaintiffs only as far as it is necessary to advance knowledge and 
learning.319 While plagiarists might be condemned on ethical grounds, 
courts employing both fair use and substantial similarity have been much 
more forgiving to nonrivals who use copyrighted work to produce their 
work the same way.320 When rivals copy, they may infringe due to 
improper appropriation. In contrast, nonrivals are more likely to fulfill 
 
 314. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other grounds 
by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975).  
 315. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 316. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 317. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
 318. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 
for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”). 
 319. See Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71, 76 
(2014) (“[E]xclusive rights in intellectual property can prevent competition in protected works, 
thereby allowing the rightsholder to charge a premium for access and ultimately limiting these 
valuable works’ diffusion to society at large. For another, given that knowledge is frequently 
cumulative, society benefits when subsequent creators are not prevented from building on 
previous artistic creations to generate new works.” (footnote omitted)); see also Loren, supra note 
310, at 1352 (“[A]s a law that is designed to provide an incentive for artists to invest their time 
and talent in the creation of new works, and as a law that exists in a capitalistic economy, a focus 
in copyright on monetary effects of the use of another’s expression is understandable.”).  
 320. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(discussing the importance of limits on the extent of protection “so as to avoid the effects of 
monopolistic stagnation”); Loren, supra note 310, at 1348 (“The genesis of fair use is in the 
recognition by courts of a need to allow for some copying of the expressive content of copyrighted 
works, lest copyright lead to monopolistic stagnation in expression.”). 
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the constitutional direction, and their use of the copyrighted work is 
therefore more likely to be “proper.” Figure 8 (below) confirms this: 
when the plaintiff and the defendant were nonrivals, defendants won on 
the merits a stunning 42.9% of the time, compared to 16.7% of the time 
when the parties were rivals.321 
 



















In sum, judges usurped plaintiffs’ access to juries and turned 
substantial similarity from a standard by which to make holistic 
comparisons of the works at issue into a convoluted rule. Further, courts 
likely relied on economic substitution rather than technical substitution 
as the yardstick for judging substantial similarity. These practices have 
combined to erode plaintiffs’ ability to effectively control uses of their 
works, with consequences for both copyright law and the civil justice 
system generally.  
Copyright law endows owners with the right to control the terms of 
access through exclusive rights because they likely have the best 
information about the value of their works; they are therefore entrusted 
with the means to corral potential users to negotiate with authors and 
obtain licenses or assignment of rights.322 In a healthy legal system, the 
 
 321. See Appendix, supra note 185. 
 322. See Nachbar, supra note 128, at 610 (“The best information about the value of a 
particular work is more likely to be held by the work’s author . . . than anyone else . . . .”). 
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specter of litigation is usually sufficient to protect those rights and deter 
would-be infringers.323  
The architecture of substantial similarity as conceived by today’s 
courts, however, inherently favors defendants. Shielding defendants 
could allow large defendants to prevent meaningful competition—as seen 
with digital news publishing businesses—who are trying to ensure 
compensation for the distribution of their content by outlets such as 
Google.324 Or, a company might embrace a rival’s work, such as software 
code, make minor tweaks, and make significant enough changes to render 
the original code obsolete. Both harm competition and hurt incentives for 
content producers. Copyright protection, even if narrow, limits this foul 
play and provides incentives for original works of authorship to flourish. 
III.  THE ARCHITECTURE OF LIABILITY 
The integrity of civil litigation depends on giving plaintiffs a 
reasonable chance to succeed. To prove substantial similarity, plaintiffs 
should only have to show that the works are holistically similar. 
Defendants could then show they copied noncopyrightable rather than 
copyrightable elements and should, therefore, be exonerated. Finally, 
requiring plaintiffs to identify the expressive aspects of the works in their 
copyright registrations will help clarify what they seek to protect and 
provide notice to defendants. These key themes inform broader scholarly 
debates on rules versus standards, doctrinal biases in civil litigation, and 
the centrality of jury trials in the American justice system. 
A.  Rules and Standards 
Arnstein formulated substantial similarity as a standard that courts 
could more easily apply to the varied facts before them.325 Professor 
Thomas Nachbar’s work reveals, however, that contrary to this, 
substantial similarity today has ossified into a set of technocratic rules.326 
Apart from their unwieldiness, outcomes under the extrinsic/intrinsic test 
and other formal rules (like the more discerning ordinary observer test) 
are inferior when they cause courts not to assign liability when the harm 
from the defendants’ conduct exceeds its benefit in copying the plaintiffs’ 
 
 323. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Empowering Individual Plaintiffs, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 1319, 1320–21 (2017). 
 324. Sara Fischer & Margaret Harding McGill, The Future of Owning Content Online, AXIOS 
(Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.axios.com/copyright-laws-digital-distributors-775bc197-79f5-4cb2 
-bba0-5c36735b43bc.html [https://perma.cc/5CCE-PLMP]. 
 325. See supra Section I.B.  
 326. See Nachbar, supra note 128, at 596 (“Other aspects of the copyright system look more 
like standards, such as the ‘substantial similarity’ test for infringement (which has been clarified 
to the point of near-rule-dom through decades of precedent) . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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work. These structured tests also require courts to compare thresholds of 
copyrightability even though balancing would be easier. 
To see why rules are an inferior means of determining substantial 
similarity, consider how modern substantial similarity tests attempt to do 
two difficult things. First, the tests must be able to metaphysically cleave 
what is copyrightable in the plaintiff’s work from what is not. This 
assumes courts have in their minds a threshold (C*) beyond which the 
plaintiff’s work (C) becomes worthy of protection (i.e., C > C*).327 
Second, courts attempt to compare what is copyrightable with the 
defendant’s work and, in so doing, determine if the defendant’s work (H) 
crosses some impermissible threshold (H*) that causes harm to the 
plaintiff, making it worthy of disapproval (i.e., H > H*).  
Finally, courts must still engage in some form of balancing. When one 
consideration favors finding similarity (say appropriating copyrightable 
content) and another opposes it (say because it involves an unprotectable 
idea), the court must balance the competing forces while taking into 
account the weight of the evidence and the importance of each factor, 
finding for the plaintiff when C < H. Antitrust law’s rule of reason uses a 
similar approach, as do Title VII and disparate impact determinations in 
anti-discrimination law, strict scrutiny and proportionality analysis in 
constitutional law,328 and personal jurisdiction analysis in civil 
procedure. 
Presented in a stylized fashion, substantial similarity occurs when 
three conditions are satisfied: (1) C > C*; (2) H > H*; and (3) C < H. In 
practice, structured rules are prone to generate capricious and wrong 
results. These errors are possible even when courts are fully informed of 
the facts required for balancing. Rules can trip courts up in two ways.329 
First, they may require courts to dismiss the case even though C < H if H 
< H*, regardless of the magnitude of C.330 The only way to eliminate this 
possibility is to regard all harm as consequential, guaranteeing that H* 
never matters.331 Second, structured decisions can result in infringement 
even though C > H where C < C*.332 The solution is to set C* the same 
as H by converting it into a balancing test; that is, in fact, what the 
Arnstein court did.  
 
 327. This discussion draws on the framework developed in Professor Kaplow’s article. See 
Louis Kaplow, Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures: Antitrust, Title VII Disparate 
Impact, and Constitutional Law Strict Scrutiny, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1381–84 (2019). 
 328. See id. at 1376, 1384. 
 329. See id. at 1382. 
 330. See id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See id. 
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Setting H* and C* modestly above zero helps filter out low-merit 
cases and saves administrative costs.333 This means that courts can 
consider if the party bringing the motion has stated a plausible claim at 
the pretrial motion stage. Requiring plaintiffs to show a holistic similarity 
between the works accomplishes that. The defendant’s rebuttal then helps 
the court to fine-tune the values of C and H, while requiring plaintiffs to 
provide claim-like details in their copyright registrations helps courts 
define the values of H* and C*. Design law’s ordinary observer test also 
contains all these elements.  
Design patents protect an ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture, and its infringement test parallels substantial similarity.334 
Both tests ask if an adjudicator taking into account protectable elements 
(and filtering out unprotectable elements) would find the works or 
appearances at issue substantially alike.335 Both tests are also concerned 
about the technical aspect: “[T]he appeal of the subject matter to the 
audience’s aesthetic perception is what defines the nature of the subject 
matter and, presumably, motivates its creation.”336 And, unlike in 
trademark law, neither is concerned about the consumer’s understanding 
as to the source of the goods.337 
 
 333. See Louis Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus Structured 
Decision Procedures, 132 HARV. L. REV. 992, 1044–46 (2019). 
 334. See Rebecca Tushnet, The Eye Alone Is the Judge: Images and Design Patents, 19 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 409, 409 (2012). Design patent looks at whether the designs are substantially the 
same. See, e.g., id. at 410–12 (“The same problem comes up in copyright, where similarities in 
unprotectable ideas or standard tropes should not suffice for liability, yet the gestalt substantial 
similarity test risks holding defendants liable because of such commonalities.”); Sylvia Ngo, Note, 
Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa: Patently Obvious? Reconciling the Ordinary Observer and Point of 
Novelty Tests, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 110, 128 (2010) (“Courts may later want to restore 
[ordinary observer] uniformity between designs and copyrights.”). 
 335. Compare Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871) (“We hold, 
therefore, that if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually 
gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an 
observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is 
infringed by the other.”), and Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (holding that the test for design patent infringement is whether the ordinary 
observer would find the two designs to be substantially the same, in light of the prior art), with 
Harney v. Sony Pictures Television, Inc., 704 F.3d 173, 179 (1st Cir. 2013) (“We have explained 
that two works are substantially similar [for purposes of a copyright infringement analysis] if [the] 
‘ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, 
and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.’” (quoting Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn 
Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988))). 
 336. Laura A. Heymann, Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Election of Rights 
Versus Selection of Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 239, 248 (2013). 
 337. Id. at 247–48 (“That is, one commits copyright or design patent infringement simply by 
copying the protected subject matter, regardless of whether that subject matter is recognizable to 
consumers as the work of the rights holder or whether it is presented as the work of the copier.”). 
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B.  Three Lessons from Egyptian Goddess 
To determine if accused designs are “substantially the same” to 
patented designs, courts employ an “ordinary observer” standard.338 The 
Supreme Court established this standard in Gorham Co. v. White.339 
There, the Court held that if a person is deceived by one design into 
thinking it is another after “giving such attention as a purchaser usually 
gives,” the defendant infringes the patented design.340 In making that 
determination, fact finders holistically compare the allegedly infringing 
product along with the figures of the design patent before them.341 
Over the years, courts, while paying lip service to Gorham, have 
burdened plaintiffs with an additional “points of novelty” requirement.342 
Courts examined the patented design’s innovative aspects individually, 
and plaintiffs had to show their patented designs departed sufficiently 
from the prior art.343 Much like modern substantial similarity tests, the 
“point of novelty” requirement confined plaintiffs to only the dissected 
elements that were new. Again, courts ostensibly did this to protect 
defendants from infringement when the accused device did not contain 
novel design features that justified awarding patentees their design 
patents in the first place.344 Whatever the reason, the points of novelty 
test, like substantial similarity, overemphasized subtle differences that 
did not affect the protected overall design, allowing defendants to avoid 
infringement by omitting one or more “points of novelty.”345 
 
The holistic comparison is limited to the claimed design. See id. If the design patent claim is only 
on the handle of the frying pan, the comparison is to the overall appearance of the handle of the 
accused product, not the overall appearance of the entire accused product.  
 338. Gorham Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 528. 
 339. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871); see id. at 528 (describing how a patent is infringed “if, 
in the eye of an ordinary observer . . . two designs are substantially the same,” which thereby 
would “deceive such an observer,” and “induc[e] him to purchase one supposing it to be the 
other”).  
 340. Id. (noting how an ordinary observer would be “giving such attention as a purchaser 
usually gives” to the overall visual impression of the design as a whole). 
 341. Bruce A. Kugler & Craig W. Mueller, A Fresh Perspective on Design Patents, COLO. 
LAW., July 2009, at 71, 71. 
 342. See, e.g., Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (describing how the plaintiff has not met the points of novelty test).  
 343. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 1113, 1118 
(Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (en banc). 
 344. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (inserting 
a novelty requirement into previous infringement tests), abrogated in part on other grounds by 
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 345. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677.  
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To address this, the Federal Circuit issued a unanimous en banc 
decision in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.346 The court reaffirmed 
Gorham’s standard for infringement—the test was whether an ordinary 
observer familiar with the prior art would think the accused infringing 
design and the patented design were substantially similar when compared 
holistically.347 In doing so, the court recognized that plaintiffs’ protection 
under design law was whittled to a husk when defendants could copy the 
overall appearance of an original work save for a few lines noticeable 
only by experts.348 Moreover, the court did not want “the point of 
novelty” to trip up fact finders, notably when the protected design 
combined existing features.349  
Novelty still mattered but was to be assessed separately.350 Placing 
this burden on defendants made sense because they had the “motivation 
to point out close prior art, and in particular to call to the court’s attention 
the prior art that an ordinary observer [was] most likely to regard as 
highlighting the differences between the claimed and accused design.”351 
 Scholars widely agree Egyptian Goddess revitalized the “ordinary 
observer” test and significantly boosted plaintiff success rates because 
patentees no longer had to prove that the allegedly infringing device 
includes all of the points of novelty found in the patented design.352 
 
 346. 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc); id. at 677 (holding that the “proper inquiry” is 
“whether the accused design has appropriated the claimed design as a whole”); see also id. at 683 
(“[A] purchaser familiar with the prior art would be deceived by the similarity between the 
claimed and accused designs . . . .”). 
 347. See id.  
 348. See id. at 670, 677 (“[The] sameness of appearance, and mere difference of lines in the 
drawing or sketch . . . or slight variances in configuration . . . will not destroy the substantial 
identity.” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 
Wall.) 511, 526–27 (1871))). 
 349. See id. at 677; see also Sarah Burnick, Note, The Importance of the Design Patent to 
Modern Day Technology: The Supreme Court’s Decision to Narrow the Damages Clause in 
Samsung v. Apple, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 283, 297–98 (2017) (describing how the reformed 
“ordinary observer” test under Egyptian Goddess makes it far easier to demonstrate infringement 
in court because the jury is able to look at the whole picture of the design, allowing the design 
patent to serve as a strong tool against infringement).  
 350. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678–79. 
 351. See id.  
 352. Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the Design 
Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531, 532 (2009/10) (“Many commentators heralded this 
decision as ushering in a new era for design protection in the United States. . . . [I]ts holding 
should make it easier to enforce design patents . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see Perry J. Saidman, 
Egyptian Goddess Exposed! But Not in the Buff(er)..., 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 859, 
884–85 (2008) (stating that eliminating the points of novelty test in Egyptian Goddess is a 
“significant boost to design patentees”); LOIS F. HERZECA & HOWARD S. HOGAN, FASHION LAW 
AND BUSINESS 180 (2013) (noting that designers have a “de facto increase in scope of protection” 
(quoting Christopher V. Carani, Design Law & Footwear: Landmark Case Fundamentally Alters 
Design Patent Enforcement, SHOE RETAILING TODAY, July–Aug. 2009, at 26)).  
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Egyptian Goddess also increased the value of design patents.353 It is worth 
underscoring the causal link between shifting the burden of production to 
defendants and the increase in the value of the intellectual property 
right,354 as well as the inquiry being a factual and not a legal one.355 In 
these aspects, the success of Egyptian Goddess provides an essential 
roadmap for reforming substantial similarity.  
1.  Compare the Works as Wholes 
In design law, holistic comparisons maintain the “focus on those 
aspects of a design which render the design different from prior art 
designs,” while at the same time avoiding “the risk of assigning 
exaggerated importance to small differences between the claimed and 
accused designs relating to an insignificant feature simply because that 
feature can be characterized as a point of novelty.”356 Like Egyptian 
Goddess, Arnstein gave courts a tool that allowed them to simply look at 
two works as a first step and determine if they were similar without 
engaging in complicated mental dissections of copyrightable content.357 
As Christopher Carani and Dunstan Barnes noted: 
[E]xclusivity rights conferred by a design patent are for the 
overall appearance of the design as set forth in the design 
patent. For example, for a design patent directed to a hinge, 
it does not protect how the hinge swivels. Rather, the design 
patent only protects the appearance of the hinge. Faithful 
 
 353. Susan Scafidi, Towards A Jurisprudence of Fashion, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 429, 430 (2019) (“In Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, the Federal Circuit’s abandonment 
of a five-point novelty test for design patent infringement made design patents a far more 
attractive means of protection for all sorts of fashion-related products, not just the nail buffers at 
issue in that case.”); Kugler & Mueller, supra note 341, at 73; see also Susanna Monseau, 
European Design Rights: A Model for the Protection of All Designers from Piracy, 48 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 27, 43 (2011) (“[T]he simplified test might encourage more use of design patents by fashion 
and other designers . . . .”).  
 354. See Kugler & Mueller, supra note 341, at 71 (describing “how the burden of proof has 
shifted to now favor the patent holder”); id. at 73 (describing how the holding in Egyptian Goddess 
“broadened the protection afforded by issued design patents and the potential protection afforded 
by pending design patent applications”). 
 355. See David Leason, Design Patent Protection for Animated Computer-Generated Icons, 
91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 580, 592 (2009) (“[T]here will be an increased chance of a 
trier of fact finding infringement under the guidelines set forth by the Federal Circuit in Egyptian 
Goddess.”).  
 356. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677 (quoting Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. Easter Unlimited, 
Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 357. See Du Mont, supra note 352, at 532 (“[T]he Federal Circuit . . . advised district courts 
[that] they need not provide detailed verbal descriptions for design patents during claim 
construction.”); Ngo, supra note 334, at 130 (“There are fewer technical points for a fact-finder 
to review . . . .”); see also id. at 131 (reporting “the view of many that this test is a lowered standard 
of finding infringement”). 
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adherence to the basic principle that design patents only 
protect the appearance of a product, and not its underlying 
function, should address most, if not all, concerns about 
design patents being misused as backdoor utility patents.358 
The problem is that modern copyright courts too quickly conclude that 
accused works do not infringe copyrighted works because of their 
similarity to what is in the public domain.359 An overemphasis on 
different features that are uncopyrightable departs from how real-world 
consumers perceive the work. This results in works being found 
noninfringing due to differences that would have been irrelevant to a real-
world observer.360 Professor Helfing observed: 
As to similarity in total concept and feel, the courts initially 
disfavored summary disposition because that quality is 
measured by the subjective response of an ordinary person. 
The Ninth Circuit has been mostly faithful to this judicial 
restraint. The Second Circuit, however, has loosened the 
reins and expressly authorized the summary resolution of 
claims on the basis of a judge’s emotional response to works 
of authorship.361  
Copyright law itself supports the principle of judging works 
holistically. While the Copyright Act gives little guidance on 
infringement, it does guide the nature of a work. The definition of 
“created” in the Copyright Act makes clear that works are unitary 
wholes.362 With multiple versions, each is a separate work.363 The scope 
of copyright and exclusive rights in turn map to these definitions. 
Copyright subsists in complete works, and this holistic focus on the 
“work” extends to infringement analysis. Seen in this light, the ordinary 
observer should evaluate the works’ overall effect and compare them in 
a single process without dissecting them into individual elements.  
Furthermore, holistic comparisons go beyond exact reproduction to 
encompass “various modes in which the matter of any work may be 
 
 358. Christopher V. Carani & Dunstan H. Barnes, United States, in DESIGN RIGHTS 9, 38 
(Christopher V. Carani ed., 2017). 
 359. See Tushnet, supra note 334, at 420 (“‘They all look alike to me’ is a cliché for a 
reason.”); see also Helfing, supra note 10, at 764 (“Courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
not hesitated to summarily reject infringement claims based upon a judicial determination that the 
similarity between works fails to meet the ‘objective criteria’ of protection.”). 
 360. See supra Sections I.B, II.B. 
 361. Helfing, supra note 10, at 764 (footnotes omitted). 
 362. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (noting that works are created when fixed, and when works are 
fixed in pieces over time, the then-existing fixation constitutes the work).  
 363. Id. “Joint work[s]” are created when the works of two or more authors are intertwined 
into a single, inseparable whole. Id. “Copies” are the tangible mediums in which an (entire) work 
is fixed. Id.  
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adopted, imitated, transferred, or reproduced, with more or less colorable 
alterations to disguise the piracy.”364 Every substantial similarity case 
involves nonidentical work.365 A defendant’s copied work is like purple 
paint—a mix of the plaintiff’s red paint and blue paint from the public 
domain. Plaintiffs try to convince courts that the shade of red in the purple 
paint matches the shade of red in the cans at their stores.366 If the accused 
work, seen as a whole, gives rise to a similar reaction as the protected 
work, and if, as a result, the fact finder cannot differentiate between the 
two, then there is a colorable case of infringement. Of course, there is a 
difference between holistic comparison of an ordinary observer and 
holistic comparison in light of understanding what differentiates the 
claimed design (or copyrighted expression) from the prior art (and other 
unprotected elements, like ideas and scènes à faire). Conversely, if the 
works are sufficiently distinct to the ordinary informed observer, the 
plaintiff has not met its burden of proving substantial similarity between 
the two works.367 This sets a presumptive scope of the copyrighted work, 
which defendants can then rebut.368  
Once the fact finder has determined both copying and facial similarity, 
a presumption provides a useful means of adding clarity and 
predictability to the analysis.369 The burden-shifting approach is well 
established as a means of correcting the imbalance between plaintiffs and 
defendants.370 For instance, the Federal Rules of Evidence shift the 
burden of producing evidence contradicting the presumed fact of copying 
to the defendant, while retaining the burden of persuasion with the 
plaintiff.371 Similarly, trademark plaintiffs must show that defendants’ 
use of their trademarks leads consumers to think defendants’ goods 
belong to plaintiffs, that plaintiffs endorse defendants’ goods, or that 
 
 364. See Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947). 
 365. See supra Part I.  
 366. See Helfing, supra note 10, at 743–44. 
 367. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“In 
some instances, the claimed design and the accused design will be sufficiently distinct that it will 
be clear without more that the patentee has not met its burden of proving the two designs would 
appear ‘substantially the same’ to the ordinary observer, as required by Gorham.”).  
 368. See Sarah Burstein, Intelligent Design & Egyptian Goddess: A Response to Professors 
Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 94, 98 (2019) (describing presumptive scope 
in the context of design patents).  
 369. See David S. Welkowitz, The Virtues and Vices of Clarity in Trademark Law, 81 TENN. 
L. REV. 145, 167 (2013) (advocating for presumptions as a means of improving “predictability 
and ease of determination”).  
 370. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 323, at 1357 (advocating for shifting the 
burden of proof in all cases “involving hidden interest and fees, so that the bank will lose the case 
when it fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the disputed charges are reasonable 
and fair”). 
 371. FED. R. EVID. 301. 
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plaintiffs and defendants are legally related entities.372 Once plaintiffs 
establish a facial likelihood of confusion, the law usually presumes 
harm.373 Likewise, antitrust law applies a quick look approach when even 
an observer with a rudimentary understanding of economics would 
conclude that the defendant’s arrangement would be anticompetitive.374 
Notably, the fact that the Supreme Court did not confine the analysis to a 
judge with a rudimentary understanding of economics but rather an 
observer with a rudimentary understanding of the field is instructive.375 
After defendants make their cases on uncopyrightability, fact finders can 
determine if they have carried the burden of production.  
2.  Restore the Ordinary Observer 
Egyptian Goddess was careful to point out that the differences 
between the claimed design and prior art designs could be “an important 
component” of the analysis, but it was satisfied with applying the 
“ordinary observer test through the eyes of an observer familiar with the 
prior art.”376 The ordinary observer knows the market for the claimed and 
accused designs.377 Indeed, the ordinary observer may know what an 
expert does in a sophisticated market if that is the typical consumer, but 
the default viewpoint is never that of an “expert.”378 This allows a 
meaningful comparison of the accused devices with the patented claim 
that could be made while keeping the inquiry predictable.379 
It is easy to make much ado about whether the ordinary observer is 
really “ordinary,” especially if the consumer is capable of juxtaposing 
prior art with both patentee’s and defendant’s designs.380 However, there 
 
 372. David J. Franklyn & David A. Hyman, Trademarks as Search Engine Keywords: Much 
Ado About Something?, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 481, 497–98 (2013). 
 373. Id. at 498. 
 374. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).  
 375. Garry A. Gabison, Juries Can Quick Look Too, 10 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 271, 298 
(2014) (“[I]t would be improper to assume the Court intended to restrict quick look to judges or 
the FTC because if the Court wanted such restriction, it could have simply written so.”).  
 376. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 677–78 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc); 
see Daniel J. Sherwinter, Top Intellectual Property Cases of 2008—Part I, COLO. LAW., Mar. 
2009, at 49, 55. 
 377. See Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., 942 F.3d 
1119, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 378. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871); see also Cardiac Pacemakers, 
Inc. v. Coratomic, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Minn. 1982) (noting that knowledge of prior 
art is elevated because pacemakers are expensive and the consumer is usually a specialized 
physician), aff’d, 702 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).  
 379. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 674, 677. 
 380. See Ngo, supra note 334, at 125 (“The issue now is whether EGI’s observer is, in fact, 
ordinary.”); see also Christopher V. Carani, The New “Extra-Ordinary” Observer Test for Design 
Patent Infringement—On a Crash Course with the Supreme Court’s Precedent in Gorham v. 
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is nothing novel about judging similarity through the lens of an informed 
ordinary observer when appropriate. As early as 1933, design law 
recognized that ordinary observers could be knowledgeable about the 
field in question.381 At the same time, fact finders need not put their 
everyday sensibilities and perceptions aside to judge if someone else 
would find that the defendant had infringed the copyrighted work.  
Arnstein, too, had faith that fact finders could visually or aurally 
compare most, if not all, the diverse range of copyrighted works from 
architecture to music.382 If case features like technology require expert 
testimony to educate the jury, Arnstein allows it.383 Patent law relies on a 
skilled person in the art, and trademark law relies on the perception of 
consumers.384 Copyright law’s substantial similarity test uses a hybrid 
standard, drawing both on expert and nonexpert observers; post-Arnstein, 
however, the expert/judicial assessment has subsumed the lay 
assessment, which is a question of fact.385 
Jurors routinely get the task of filtering the copyrightable from the 
uncopyrightable. In Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc.,386 the court ruled that 
the jury should have been instructed to filter out any use of the command 
interface necessary for compatibility, even if the interface was 
copyrightable.387 When courts use experts, “the experts cannot tell a jury 
whether two products are similar; however, the experts may educate a 
jury on some subtests and the function of each element of the product.”388 
 
White, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 354, 357, 370 (2009) (warning that the observer in 
Egyptian Goddess may be in conflict with the ordinary observer in Gorham Co. v. White). 
 381. See Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary observer is not any observer, but one who, with less than the trained 
facilities of the expert, is ‘a purchaser of things of similar design,’ or ‘one interested in the 
subject’ . . . one who, though not an expert, has reasonable familiarity with such objects . . . .” 
(first omission in original) (quoting Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp., 67 F.2d 
428, 430 (6th Cir. 1933))), abrogated by Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
 382. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 383. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (allowing expert testimony 
under the substantial similarity test), abrogated on other grounds by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. 
Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975).  
 384. Fromer & Lemley, supra note 312, at 1273; see also id. at 1299 (“Unlike trademark and 
patent law, copyright does assess infringement using a hybrid of technical similarity and market 
substitution from the vantage point of both the consumer and the expert.”). 
 385. See id. 
 386. 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 387. Id. at 1547 (“It is an incorrect statement of the law that interface specifications are not 
copyrightable as a matter of law. [Defendant] is correct, however, in arguing that the district court 
erred in not instructing the jury on the legal consequences of copying dictated by compatibility 
requirements.” (footnote omitted)). 
 388. Gabison, supra note 375, at 302. 
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The fact finder then makes the final decision on the question of 
infringement.389 
Keeping the inquiry grounded in real-world perceptions of the 
intended audience will make the infringement decisions more consistent 
because the fact finders need not elevate the ordinary observer at a whim, 
based on the consumer’s knowledge, while automatically tailoring the 
ordinary observer to the specific work of authorship at issue. According 
to Professor Helfing, judges pose a greater risk in reaching biased 
outcomes compared to juries since “[a] judge is more likely to make the 
decision based upon a comparison of an emotional response to relevant—
that is, protected—content; a jury, however, provides better 
representation of that fictitious ordinary person whose emotions are 
meant to be the measure of that response.”390 
Reasonable minds may disagree on normative questions that concern 
the permissibility of similar use. However, it is the public, as represented 
by the jury, instead of the judge, for whom copyright and its fruits exist. 
A heterogeneous jury offers a more diversified perspective that informs 
the meaning and implications of judging similarity. It is time to return to 
the original conception of substantial similarity as a fact-intensive inquiry 
most appropriate for the jury. 
3.  Include a Claim-Like Requirement in Copyright Registrations 
Copyright plaintiffs have exclusive rights in their works. Unlike other 
types of intellectual property rights, however, those rights are only 
defined at the point of infringement. Requiring copyright owners to 
provide a simple description of what they claim to be copyrightable in the 
work (and therefore protected by copyright law) will help stakeholders 
have a better idea of its scope before infringement. During litigation, that 
description will help focus the fact finder’s attention on the copyrightable 
aspects of the plaintiff’s work in making the infringement determination.  
While copyright ownership exists without registration, copyright law 
requires plaintiffs to register their work as a precondition to a civil action 
for copyright infringement.391 To register, the copyright owner delivers 
 
 389. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other 
grounds by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975).  
 390. Helfing, supra note 10, at 765.  
 391. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) 
(noting that infringement depends only on plaintiffs’ establishing ownership of a valid copyright 
and on defendants’ copying original elements in those works); see also Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 684 (2014) (“Although registration is ‘permissive,’ both the 
certificate and the original work must be on file with the Copyright Office before a copyright 
owner can sue for infringement.” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 408)); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 
23 F.3d 1345, 1349 (8th Cir. 1994) (“While registration is required under section 411 of the 
Copyright Act in order to bring a suit for infringement, infringement itself is not conditioned upon 
 
60
Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol73/iss3/3
2021] SAVING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY 651 
 
to the U.S. Copyright Office an application, a fee, and a deposit of one or 
more copies of the work.392 Since the bar to copyrightability is extremely 
low, this stage is largely pro forma.393 A registration specialist then 
examines the materials to determine whether the work constitutes 
copyrightable subject matter and if the applicant has met the other legal 
and formal requirements.394 Prior to 2019, circuits disagreed over 
whether copyright is registered when the U.S. Copyright Office receives 
the copyright holder’s application or when the Office acts on the 
application.395 In any case, neither plaintiffs nor defendants know the 
scope of the copyright for the work before a court’s determination.  
To patent and trademark scholars, that indeterminacy is astounding. 
Patent and trademark registrations provide notice to third parties of both 
the existing right and its potential scope.396 For example, patents 
generally contain three parts: the specification, the drawings, and the 
claims.397 The specification and the drawings provide a complete 
description of the new invention, including how to make and use it.398 A 
patent must also contain one or more claims that precisely define the 
invention.399  
Once the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issues the patent, the 
information contained in the patent gives the public notice of what 
constitutes the “patented invention.”400 The patent claims define the legal 
 
registration of the copyright. Thus, a copyright holder can register a copyright and file suit after 
infringement occurs.” (citation omitted)). 
 392. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a); see also id. § 408(b) (listing what shall be included in the material 
deposited for registration).  
 393. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as 
they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.” (quoting 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 41, § 1.08[C][1])). Since most works are not registered unless or 
until litigation, this leads to a lack of knowledge of what is out there. Cf. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 4, § 7.16[B][3] (stating that only sometimes do copyright owners register their works 
long before infringement and discussing many cases in which copyright owners did not register 
their works before wanting to sue). 
 394. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 602.4(B) 
(3d ed. 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2UA 
-6J6E].  
 395. See Thomas M. Landrigan, Note, Application or Registration?: Confusion Regarding 
the Copyright Act’s Prerequisite to Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 44 IND. L. REV. 581, 585 
(2011). In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split. See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit 
Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 886 (2019) (holding that registration occurs when 
the Copyright Office acts on the application and officially registers the copyright). 
 396. In the case of trademarks, the notice provides a representation of the mark, as well as 
the goods and services the mark covers. In the case of patents, the notice informs the claimed 
scope of the invention. 
 397. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2). 
 398. Id. § 112(a). 
 399. Id. § 112(b). 
 400. Id. § 271(a). 
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boundaries of the invention and the owner’s corresponding right to 
exclude.401 Egyptian Goddess instructed that designs “‘typically are 
claimed as shown in drawings,’ and that claim construction ‘is adapted 
accordingly.’”402 While claim construction has its share of problems, it 
helps resolve the structural uncertainties in copyright scope related to 
substantial similarity.403 
Judging substantial similarity can be daunting, precisely because the 
fact finder must distinguish copyrightable expression from unprotected 
factual description without the linguistic aids like those found in patent 
claims.404 A brief description setting out the expressive elements in the 
work would go a long way in helping to clarify the claimed copyright 
scope of the work ahead of litigation. Requiring a claim-like requirement, 
together with restoring the ordinary observer and comparing works 
holistically, will help courts apply both technical and market-based 
approaches to substantial similarity. 
The obstacle to successful implementation may be one of cost-
effective design. The copyright system deals with a staggering number of 
works—over 38 million in fiscal year 2018 alone.405 Each patent 
application costs about $15,000–$20,000 to draft and prosecute.406 
Further, unless the U.S. Copyright Office examines the claims’ 
substantive validity, including protectable elements, it is easy to dismiss 
the claims as less valuable than those examined under the patent system.  
However, these objections rest on two fundamental errors. First, 
copyright claims need not be crafted by experts, particularly if substantial 
similarity is ultimately a question for the ordinary observer and not the 
person having ordinary skill in the art (as is the case in patent law). 
Indeed, much ink has been spilled in this Article in arguing precisely that 
the law has become too technocratic in its reliance on pretrial motions 
and expert evidence. Jurors, looking through the lens of the ordinary 
observer, seek to determine if the works are holistically similar and 
 
 401. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“It is a ‘bedrock 
principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is 
entitled the right to exclude.’” (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., 
Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004))). 
 402. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(quoting Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
2007)). 
 403. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 42, at 2203 (advocating that nonpatent regimes 
look into modified forms of Markman proceedings). 
 404. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 405. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 2018, at 6 (2018), 
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2018/ar2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MBF-8Z69]. 
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account for whatever defendants claim to be unprotectable in their 
analysis. Like the ordinary observer test itself, the copyright registration 
provides a lay reference point, not an expert reference point as to what is 
protectible. Second, the perfect is the enemy of the good. At the current 
baseline, courts do not consider copyright registrations in assessing 
substantial similarity. The goal is not the technical precision of patent 
claims but simply requiring copyright registrants to state what it is they 
think is copyrightable. Systemic costs and lawyering fees are obstacles if 
one seeks to replicate the patent system, but that is not the goal here. Even 
simple linguistic aids would be an improvement over the status quo. 
Technology is making registration simpler for authors. Starting in 
August 2020, “social media influencers and other authors of online 
content can take advantage of a new group copyright registration option 
for short online works such as blog entries, social media posts and web 
articles.”407 “Authors could even register their own comments to a social 
[media] post as separate copyrightable works in certain situations.”408 
Developments like these are promising, and they illustrate why one 
should never assume things cannot be done differently simply because 
they have never been done before.   
C.  Broader Implications 
Beyond copyright, insights on reforming substantial similarity 
contribute directly to broader scholarly debates on rules versus standards, 
doctrinal biases in civil litigation, and the centrality of jury trials in the 
American justice system.    
1.  Rules and Standards 
Scholars have long debated whether rules or standards best translate 
policy into law.409 People frequently interact with some areas of the law, 
such as healthcare, safety regulations, and the vesting of intellectual 
property rights. For this reason, the requirement that original works be 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression to enjoy protection is a rule.410 
It determines whether copyright exists—a determination that occurs 
 
 407. Jason Mueller & Robert Hough II, United States: Easier Copyright Registration 
Coming for Blogs and Social Media Posts, MONDAQ (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.mondaq.com/ 
unitedstates/copyright/975216/easier-copyright-registration-coming-for-blogs-and-social-media-
posts-?email_access=on [https://perma.cc/K8TC-LLLC]. 
 408. Id.  
 409. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 
65, 65 (1983).  
 410. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
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much more frequently than whether a defendant has infringed on that 
copyright. People interact less often with other laws, such as those 
relating to negligence and substantial similarity. When they do, factual 
permutations can materially differ, or they cannot foresee all potential 
abuses of the law and how best to address them.411 Since designing a rule 
for every contingency is counterproductive, the law prefers to use 
standards to balance different factors because they are easier to craft and 
tend to better track policy goals.412 
To properly apply substantial similarity, one must identify the 
threshold of substantiality and the kinds of copying public policy favors. 
Substantial similarity jurisprudence currently does not have much 
theoretical depth. Courts need to provide that content through better 
theorized precedent. Standards, therefore, shift that cost ex post to 
attorneys and courts who apply them on a case-by-case basis.413  
Judges may have little incentive to spend the time and effort to master 
the literature sufficiently to contribute to that depth, and the court’s 
precedent may not be sufficiently similar to future fact patterns to predict 
how the law would apply. This may also have something to do with the 
fact that, as this Article shows, judges today approach substantial 
similarity as a matter of first impression.414 Like muddy footprints, 
substantial similarity shows the imprint of judges forced to apply 
complex rules rather than the everyday wisdom of the ordinary 
observer.415 
As seen in Section III.B, infringement determinations are made after 
the fact and only during litigation. Some parties may therefore not bother 
to consult the law before acting. The ones who do must seek expert advice 
in ordering their affairs since even judges and scholars cannot correctly 
understand the standard’s technocratic contours. This feeds back into a 
loop between the courts and those they serve—one that obfuscates the 
law more and more over time. 
Fact-specific standards can be disadvantageous, but they do fare better 
than strict rules in changing circumstances.416 A decades-old standard can 
be applied to conduct using present understandings. In contrast, rules 
 
 411. Legal scholar Roscoe Pound stated that “no two cases of negligence have been alike or 
ever will be alike.” ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 142 (1922). 
 412. See Nachbar, supra note 128, at 599 (“Generally, reallocations involving consumptive 
uses tend to look more like rules and those regarding productive uses tend to look more like 
standards, which makes sense if the effect of productive uses on the underlying work is more 
highly variable than the effect of consumptive uses.”). 
 413. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 563 (1992).  
 414.  See supra Section II.B.2.  
 415. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 47–48 (1990). 
 416. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.3, at 556 (6th ed. 
2003). 
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must be tweaked continuously, which requires more effort. When laws 
cover disparate works of authorship, most relevant scenarios are likely to 
be more idiosyncratic. Section III.A makes a case for returning to 
standards-based adjudication of substantial similarity, and Section III.B 
sets out how to do so with reference to Egyptian Goddess. At the same 
time, clarity depends on more than formal enactments, precedents, and 
the results of past cases.  
Perfect clarity would be unrealistic. Instead, courts should keep an eye 
on the marginal cost and benefit of the level of clarity sufficient for their 
precedential decisions to identify factors that influence the 
determination.417 Compared to the overly technocratic rules-based 
formulations of substantial similarity, parties who know peers would 
judge their actions can more easily adjust their actions to societal norms 
based on what they think a lay jury would find appropriate. Individuals’ 
common knowledge will allow confident prediction in some contexts, 
even when precise official pronouncements are either not consulted or do 
not exist.  
2.  Judges and Juries 
The widespread practice of treating substantial similarity as a de facto 
question of law for a judge to decide should be a matter of constitutional 
concern.418 Substantial similarity remains an issue of fact, despite most 
judges deeming it appropriate to decide on behalf of the jury when “no 
reasonable jury” would disagree with them.419 When courts do not follow 
the rules of summary judgment, such as when courts declare that no 
issues exist for a jury to determine when such issues do exist, judges, in 
fact, rob plaintiffs of the right to trial by jury.420  
That right to a trial by jury stretches back to 1791, when the new 
United States of America ratified the Bill of Rights, the first ten 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution, confirming the fundamental rights 
 
 417. Kaplow, supra note 413, at 582 (“[T]he value of a more accurate ex post adjudication 
lies in its ex ante effect on behavior.”).  
 418. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 135–36 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) 
(“‘[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and 
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.’ . . . A little water, trickling here and there 
through a dam, is a small matter in itself; but it may be a sinister menace to the security of the 
dam, which those living in the valley below will do well to heed.” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886))). 
 419. See supra Section II.B. 
 420. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1075 (2003) (acknowledging constitutional problems in 
summary judgment that arise in certain circumstances and declaring that “if no ‘genuine issue of 
material fact’ exists and the movant is entitled to judgment ‘as a matter of law,’ pretrial disposition 
does not raise questions of constitutional dimensions”). 
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of its citizens.421 The Founders considered the guarantee of a jury trial 
“essential in every free country,”422 reflecting the trust in citizens to 
decide a matter requiring discretionary judgment more than a single 
aristocratic judge.423 The rationale was that juries were the best available 
means to “rein in corrupt or overactive judges.”424 
The Supreme Court first introduced the reasonable observer standard 
in Lynch v. Donnelly,425 and it “gradually became a part of the Court’s 
Establishment Clause doctrine as a means for evaluating the 
constitutionality of a government action’s effect.”426 In Salazar v. 
Buono,427 the Court acknowledged that the reasonable observer standard 
is a fact-sensitive inquiry.428 Professor Garry Gabison observed that “[i]t 
seems almost natural that a jury of our peers would be more adept to 
express this average opinion than a bench of well-educated judges.”429 
He also noted that “the reasonable observer standard has evolved into a 
mixed question of law and fact and with Salazar, seems to [be] moving 
closer to a question of fact.”430 Whether judges’ experience or familiarity 
with the doctrine provides them with an advantage in drawing the 
inferences is open to question as a general matter.431 The data in Section 
II.B show most judges encounter substantial similarity cases as a matter 
of first impression, and they have failed to bring clarity to the doctrine 
despite having decades to do so. 
Some might argue that the pendulum has swung too far. Many jurors 
lack higher educational backgrounds and, therefore, the legal 
sophistication to draw and weigh inferences in complex or high-stakes 
 
 421. See Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in 
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 22 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); see also 
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 212 (1999) (“By the time of Magna Carta the 
inquest in civil cases was becoming fairly well established as the trial jury, although not in 
criminal cases.”). 
 422. Federal Farmer IV: Oct. 12, 1787, INFOPLEASE (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.infoplease 
.com/primary-sources/government/anti-federalist-papers/federal-farmer-iv [https://perma.cc/84 
VG-YKRR]. 
 423. See From Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux, 19 July 1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0275 [https://perma.cc/T766-M62J] 
(observing that the jury system “is the only way to ensure a long-continued and honest 
administration of its powers”). 
 424. Landsman, supra note 421, at 38. 
 425. 465 U.S. 668 (1984); id. at 688, 692–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 426. Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer’s 
Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 445 (2006).  
 427. 559 U.S. 700 (2010). 
 428. Id. at 721. 
 429. Gabison, supra note 375, at 300. 
 430. Id. (footnote omitted). The legal standard is so underspecified that it is easy for it to be 
treated more like a question of law⎯and thus for the judge.  
 431. Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional Conflicts in Deciding Fair Use on 
Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 517 (2010). 
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copyright infringement cases.432 The dispute between Oracle and Google 
contains both features.433 However, this overstates the factual issues 
before jurors, which are usually straightforward judgments, and which 
are made even simpler by this Article’s proposed reforms.434 In any case, 
juries regularly consider complex factual issues. Antitrust cases require 
juries to consider complex economic arguments, such as the impact of 
anticompetitive activities on the competitive market.435 Products liability 
cases require juries to weigh the safety benefits of an omitted design 
feature against the costs of including it, accounting for any reduction in 
the utility of the product.436 
Those distrustful of juries’ ability to judge similarity can impose rules 
to guide them.437 To develop meaningful guidance, jurors could be asked 
to offer opinions or identify salient factors. Federal criminal sentencing 
guidelines reflect such an approach.438 Government action outside the 
formal lawmaking processes can also provide meaningful guidance for 
future behavior through Copyright Office Manuals or guidelines as the 
federal antitrust agencies issue to shape standards for compliance in 
intellectual property licensing.439 These may have a substantial impact of 
soft law, even if the results are not embodied in a regulation or formally 
binding in a negligence suit or other legal proceeding.  
Professors Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel’s seminal work for the 
University of Chicago Jury Project showed juries were superior in 
mediating disputes involving complex societal values.440 Several scholars 
 
 432. See David Nimmer, Juries and the Development of Fair Use Standards, 31 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 563, 587–89 (2018) (recognizing the belief that “laymen were not fit to 
discharge the duties [of deciding the fair use issue] that were challenging even to specialists in the 
field,” and arguing against that belief). 
 433. See Susan Decker, Google Could Owe Oracle $8.8 Billion in Android Fight, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2018, 2:33 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-
27/oracle-wins-revival-of-billion-dollar-case-against-google [https://perma.cc/M5HQ-WQZ4]. 
 434. See supra Section III.B. 
 435. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 497–98 
(1988).  
 436. See, e.g., Casey v. Toyota Motor Eng’g Mfg. N. Am., Inc., 770 F.3d 322, 333–34 (5th 
Cir. 2014).  
 437. Kaplow, supra note 333, at 1057 (“[W]hen decisionmakers are not entirely reliable, 
rules that constrain balancing—and thereby sometimes result in decisions contrary to what a 
properly performed balance would prescribe—can be desirable.”).  
 438. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 439. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 394 (providing guidance to agency 
personnel, the courts, and the public on copyright law and registration); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/download [https://perma.cc/GB4R-8NKF] 
(publishing the government’s antitrust enforcement policy regarding intellectual property). 
 440. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3 (1971). 
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made a similar argument in the context of determining fair use of 
copyrighted works.441 Notably, Professor Ned Snow argued:  
The established practices and understandings of a 
community define whether a use’s purpose is socially 
beneficial, whether the content of the original work merits 
strong protection, whether the defendant used a significant 
quantity or a qualitatively substantial amount of the original 
work, and whether the use could plausibly cause harm to a 
potential market of the copyrighted work.442  
Each case potentially deprives individual members of the public of 
their property rights. Diversity brings a divergence of cultural 
understandings, practices, and norms that may be central to deciding how 
far those rights should reach. 
3.  Plaintiffs and Defendants 
Rights and duties form the foundation of the American legal 
system.443 These include freedom, bodily integrity, and property interests 
and, concomitantly, obligations that third parties must adhere to.444 
Rights, however, are not self-enforcing, and right holders must have a 
credible legal means of vindicating them if they are to have any meaning. 
Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein’s work shows that the 
best way to realize the goals of compensation and deterrence is to enable 
victims to pursue individual justice against those who wronged them.445 
Class actions can deter wrongdoing but provide limited compensation for 
the individual class members.446 Compensation funds also recompense 
victims but do little to prevent future wrongs.447 
 
 441. See, e.g., Ned Snow, Who Decides Fair Use—Judge or Jury?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 275, 
325 (2019) (“This characteristic of diversity is especially relevant in deciding whether a use is 
fair, for an assessment of fairness demands an understanding of cultural norms and social 
values.”); see also Lloyd L. Weinreb, Commentary, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (1990) (“The reference to fairness in the doctrine of fair 
use imparts to the copyright scheme a bounded normative element that . . . . gives effect to the 
community’s established practices and understandings . . . .”). 
 442. Snow, supra note 441, at 325–26 (“The institution of a judge, by contrast, lacks such a 
heterogeneous perspective.”). 
 443. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28 (1913). 
 444. Id. at 20–25, 28–32, 41 (distinguishing legal and nonlegal interests). 
 445. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 323, at 1325 (“Lawsuits by individual victims are 
unique in that they constitute the only litigation form that simultaneously advances the twin goals 
of deterring wrongdoers and compensating victims.”). 
 446. Id. at 1325, 1352 (“[C]lass actions systematically fail to compensate individual 
plaintiffs for their losses.”).  
 447. Id. at 1325. 
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Like copyright plaintiffs, plaintiffs elsewhere face systemic bias. In a 
breach of contract suit, the plaintiff must cumulatively show a valid 
contract that imposes a duty on the defendant to act or refrain from acting, 
and that the defendant breached the duty in a way that harmed the 
plaintiff.448 In contrast, the defendant can rebut each element in multiple 
ways.449 The procedural asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants 
translates into plaintiffs expending resources to establish each element of 
their cause of action, while defendants focus on a single ground to defend. 
It is essential that plaintiffs face rigorous scrutiny in their attempt to 
vindicate their rights. Still, when the numbers show steep declines in their 
win rates in areas such as substantial similarity not seen elsewhere, the 
civil justice system must be alert in examining and addressing the causes.  
CONCLUSION 
In 2018, David Zindel lost in a California federal district court on 
claims that Fox Searchlight’s Academy Award-winning film “The Shape 
of Water” copied his father’s 1969 play.450 The court dismissed the case, 
concluding that any extrinsic similarities between the works were “too 
general to be protected,” and that, as a matter of law, the works were not 
substantially similar.451 Before the Ninth Circuit, Zindel argued it was 
wrong to dismiss copyright infringement suits on a pretrial motion, 
calling it “not only unwise, but even a denial of due process.”452 The 
Ninth Circuit agreed.453 Victories like these make the news, but they also 
hide the worst decline in the viability of substantial similarity claims over 
the past century—something this Article reveals.  
Substantial similarity requires courts to determine if copyrightable 
aspects of the original work are present in the accused work. If so, fact 
finders must decide if the accused work has sufficiently misappropriated 
the protected elements to find infringement. The means for judging 
similarity must strike a balance between providing ardent protection for 
copyrightable works while allowing those who create innovative new 
designs to use them fairly. 
 
 448. E.g., Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1121 (Cal. 2011).  
 449. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS (8th ed. 2013) (explaining 
elements and defenses of contract actions).  
 450. Blake Brittain, Ex-Judge Kozinski Wins IP Ruling After Scandal-Marred Retirement, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 23, 2020, 9:40 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/kozinski-gets-
shape-of-water-case-reinstated-by-ninth-circuit [https://perma.cc/7X7M-WRFX]. 
 451.  Zindel v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. CV18-1435, 2018 WL 3601842, at *7 
(C.D. Cal. July 23, 2018), rev’d, 815 F. App’x 158, 159–60 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 452. Blake Brittain & Melissa Heelan Stanzione, Kozinski Argues Case at 9th Circuit After 
Sex Misconduct Claims, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 9, 2019, 4:35 PM), https://news.bloomberg 
law.com/us-law-week/kozinski-returns-to-9th-cir-to-argue-shape-of-water-case [https://perma.cc 
/RB4S-BYQF]. 
 453. Zindel v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 815 F. App’x 158, 159–60 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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Reform should focus on three aspects. First, courts should judge 
works holistically from the vantage of an informed ordinary observer. 
Avoiding elemental dissections of the copyrighted work makes 
substantial similarity easier for fact finders to administer, which makes 
them less likely to penalize plaintiffs whose works invariably incorporate 
some unprotectable elements. Second, instead of indulgently granting 
pretrial motions to defendants, courts should restore to the jurors their 
proper role. The determinations about what appears similar to the work’s 
intended audience is one the jury is well-positioned to make (with expert 
advice, when appropriate). Third, plaintiffs’ identifying expressive 
elements in copyright registrations will help clarify what they seek to 
protect and provide notice to defendants.  
Plaintiffs are indispensable to our legal system. They play a pivotal 
role in exposing misconduct, and they help the copyright system achieve 
its policy goals. Like predators in any ecological system, plaintiffs are 
easy to vilify because their success necessarily means the demise of their 
prey; in the case of copyright, making defendants pay royalties or having 
them enjoined from their intended use. Erase any meaningful chance of 
success, however, and the engine for producing creative new works will 
splutter and collapse. The most important and immediate benefit of 
reforming substantial similarity would be plaintiffs’ restored ability to 
prove improper, actionable infringement. Restoring a reasonable chance 
of succeeding in litigation to plaintiffs helps preserve public trust in the 
law, and it is the right thing to do. 
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